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To cite this article: David Spindler (2009) A Twice-Scorned Mongol Woman, the Raid of 1576, and the Building of the Brick Great Wall, *Ming Studies*, 2009:60, 66-94, DOI: [10.1179/175975909X12589849512419](https://doi.org/10.1179/175975909X12589849512419)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1179/175975909X12589849512419>



Published online: 18 Jul 2013.



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A Twice-Scorned Mongol Woman, the Raid of 1576, and the Building of the Brick Great Wall¹

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A small Mongol raid during the night of July 6 1576 on the border northeast of Beijing was a precipitating factor in the rebuilding of key sections of the Great Wall with brick and mortar. This iconic form of Great Wall prominently featured at tourist sites and in photographs never became the most common form of wall on China's northern border, but it was used in some of the most strategically important spots along the eastern third of northern China's fortifications. The 1576 raid, which I refer to as the "Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman," is an important chapter in the story of the Ming Great Wall. More broadly, this event is significant because it shows the importance of the complex and critical role that even minor antagonists play in affecting the actions of major powers.

KEYWORDS Great Wall, Brick, Simatai, Sengge, Great *Beyiji*

Reasons for Mongol raiding and perspectives on Chinese responses

In examining the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman, it is helpful to keep in mind the more fundamental questions of Mongol raiding, the origins of the brick Great Wall, and Ming response to Mongol actions. Below, I briefly review scholarship to date in each of these three areas. Explanations for why the Mongols raided China have so far focused on several factors. Arthur Waldron's review of the literature on this subject suggests three alternative explanations. First, overpopulation on the steppe or a degradation of steppe ecology led nomads to seek outside sources of food. Second, an agricultural society's refusal of trade relations made it necessary for nearby nomads to forcibly take from them what they needed. Third, by raiding, an ambitious leader could form inter-tribal confederations and reward his followers. Waldron also presents a fourth explanation: that the material needs of a developing nomadic society changed over time, resulting in the greater demand for goods from a settled society, which presumably cannot always be satisfied by trading.²

When viewed across the broad sweep of history, these explanations are logical and satisfying. The next step in understanding Mongol raiding in the Ming dynasty is to look deeper at the Mongol reasons for launching individual raids. Scholars to date have focused on the largest Mongol raids. Cao Yongnian points out that Altan Khan's (Ch. 俺答, 1507–1582) raids of the 1540s aimed to pressure the Chinese into granting the Tumed Mongols trade and diplomatic relations.³ Bai Cuiqin explains Esen's (Ch. 也先, ?–1455) raid on China in 1449 as resulting from his burgeoning power and his escalating diplomatic and economic demands upon China.⁴ Unfortunately, other Ming-era Mongol raids and their underlying reasons have been largely ignored by scholars.

The Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman also sheds light on the emergence of the fired brick Great Wall at the end of the Ming dynasty. Despite its iconic status, scholars have devoted little attention to when and why this form of wall was constructed. Cheng Dalin mentions that during the time Tan Lun (谭纶, 1520–1577) and Qi Jiguang (戚继光, 1528–1588) served in the Ji and Chang Defense Commands (薊镇, 昌镇), the wall was built with brick and towers were built along the top of it.⁵ He is not more specific about when these events happened.⁶ A book on the Huangya Guan (黄崖关) section of the Great Wall in eastern Hebei does point out when this particular stretch was built in brick, and notes that the Ji Defense Command wall in general was faced with brick starting in the Wanli reign era (1573–1620), quoting a 1576 passage to support this.⁷ A 1931 article by Yang Shuying quotes the same passage to show that the wall was improved starting in 1576, but does not emphasize that the improved wall used brick.⁸

To date, scholars have looked at Ming defense policy formation largely through the lens of the Ming court. Waldron's well-known book, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth*, devotes two chapters to Ming court debates over how to deal with the Mongols in the Ordos region. In these chapters, we learn how these debates, with input from officials along the border, resulted in Ming border defense policy in this important region.⁹ Alastair Johnston's discussion of Ming border policy formation focuses on theories of border defense proposed by senior Chinese officials.¹⁰ These approaches, while providing a helpful perspective, fall short on two fronts. One is that an approach to events on the Mongol side that considers only points of Mongol-Chinese contact such as raids, trading, or diplomacy ignores complex intra-Mongolian politics that led to those contacts. Second, viewing Ming border policy formation from the point of view of the court exaggerates the central government's role in the process. To a great extent, Ming border defense policy proposals originated from the Supreme Commanders (总督) or the Grand Coordinators (巡抚).¹¹ They were approved or disapproved, with minimum deliberation, by the Ministry of War (兵部) and (in name) the emperor; funded by the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Revenue (户部); and then executed by officials in the various Defense Commands. Funding for Ming wall-building projects was typically split between the two ministries, with the Ministry of Revenue funding 70 percent of the project and the Ministry of War covering the remaining 30 percent.¹² For this reason, except for

the 1460s, when general wall-building policy in the Ordos region was debated by high-level officials, trying to evaluate Ming dynasty wall building solely through the framework of the central government is too limiting.

Wall-building as a defensive response

Border wall-building has been a consistent element of Chinese defense policies for the past 2500 years. Different empires have approached this problem in different ways, depending on the relative autonomy of border-area administrative units, the nature of the threat by nomadic powers, and the technology available for wall-building. Pre-Ming dynasties completed relatively large sections of wall using piled fieldstone or rammed earth in short periods of time to secure long stretches along their borders. In 221 BC, the Qin dynasty built “over 10,000 li” of wall from Lintao (临洮) to Liaodong (遼東).¹³ In 557, the Northern Qi dynasty completed over 400 li of wall.¹⁴ The distances and lengths of time to complete the project are quite imprecise, but the point is that long sections of wall were often built over relatively short periods of time. These projects were conceived by the central government and executed directly under its auspices.

Ming dynasty wall-building was more decentralized, because it was tailored to localized Mongol threats by one or more of the three large Ming-era Mongol groups. Each wall-building project was designed to meet imminent or potential threats along short sections of the empire’s northern border. These wall-building projects were never larger in scope than a single Defense Command (镇、边镇), and were often as short as a few hundred meters.¹⁵ This pattern of wall-building developed partly because of the executive autonomy of Supreme Commanders and Grand Coordinators over the border Defense Commands that they commanded.

Background to the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman

The Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman is a helpful lens through which to assess the complex relations between Mongol groups that led to raids and the Chinese response to these raids. The area’s distinctive terrain led to a series of important wall-building projects preceding the Raid of 1576.

Pre-history and history of the raid area

During the Mesozoic Era (250–65 million years ago), a northerly plate around sixty miles northeast of Beijing, in the northern part of Miyun District (密云区), was undermined by a southerly plate, causing the northerly plate to rise up at a 70°–80° angle, forming a ridge.¹⁶ This ridge rises over two thousand feet from a streambed on its west end near the village of Simatai (司马台) to the highest point on the ridge one and one-half miles to the east, with an average gradient exceeding 25 percent.¹⁷ In addition to its steep rise, this ridge is also striking because of its narrowness and the sheer face on the southern side. As the ridge rises towards its most precipitous heights, it dips, forming a natural cleft in the ridge before rising sharply up a steep

slope known in modern times as the “Stairway to Heaven” (天梯).¹⁸ This natural gap in Ming times was called “Falcon Gap” (鸦鹊安).¹⁹

West of Simatai are two parallel, but lower, ridges. Roughly eight miles west of Simatai, the Chao River (潮河) cuts through these two ridges at a place known in Ming times and now as Gubei Kou (古北口). From Gubei Kou, the Chao River runs south, past the seat of government for Miyun District, and joins the Bai River (白河) to form the Chaobai River (潮白河), which eventually discharges into Bohai Bay (渤海湾) just north of the port of Tianjin. As the highest points around, these two ridges west of Simatai and the single ridge to its east are the most logical positions from which to defend against incursions from the north.

Early walls in the Gubei Kou-Simatai area

Because of its close proximity to the low-lying Chao River, both the Northern Qi dynasty and the Ming dynasty built walls east of the river and west of Simatai. The Northern Qi dynasty built wall along one of the ridges west of Simatai in 550 AD, and the Ming dynasty built wall on the same ridge and/or a nearby ridge.²⁰ A common assertion among Ming and later scholars is that the early Ming military official Xu Da (徐达, 1332–1385) supervised the building of walls from Gubei Kou to the Bohai Bay. This assertion appears to be unsupported by specific historical evidence, as Xie Dingran points out.²¹ As early as the sixth year of the Hongwu reign (1373), Ming officials called for the manning of a border defense line composed of 121 passes from the coastline to Huiling (灰岭) in the western reaches of the Beijing region, and from Wangping Kou (王平口) in western Beijing to Guanzuo Ling (官座岭) in western Hebei.²² Nine years later, another Ming official called for the manning of 200 passes from the Bohai Bay to an area just west of Beijing.²³ The Ming texts do not explicitly mention fortifications, nor do they mention any related construction projects. Nonetheless, for several reasons, we can conclude that there were at least some form of fortifications in the Simatai area. First, previous dynasties such as the Northern Qi had built walls in this area, making it highly likely that these fortifications were extant in the early Ming era. Second, the sheer number and density of passes mentioned (121 and 200) in this area makes it extremely unlikely that soldiers were using nothing more than the natural features of the terrain to defend this line. Third, several Ming sources mention that most of the passes were “established” (建) during the Hongwu reign era.²⁴ Finally, we also know that by 1410 the Ming dynasty had built fortifications in the Gubei Kou area.²⁵

Whether or not these fortifications constitute a Great Wall depends of course on one’s definition of a wall, a question for which there is as yet no consensus. Although Waldron does not provide a definition for what constitutes a Great Wall or a border wall, he maintains that the abovementioned early Ming fortifications were not walls, and that the Ming dynasty did not build border walls until the 1440s.²⁶ Cheng Dalin, China’s most accomplished authority on the Great Wall, maintains that there is currently no satisfactory definition of the Great Wall, and that more thorough field work is necessary even to arrive at such a definition.²⁷ Luo Zhewen, China’s

pre-eminent authority on pre-modern architecture, has offered a simple, three part definition: a Great Wall must be (1) long, (2) not circular, and (3) defensive in nature.²⁸ For the specific purpose of this article about the Simatai area, I believe that it is adequate to use the low-threshold criteria of “a linear manned border defense system, consisting, in key points, of unenclosed walls” as a definition of a Great Wall. Here, the term “unenclosed” is meant to exclude fort walls or city walls. By this definition, the defensive system in place by the early Ming dynasty at Simatai qualifies as a Great Wall.

The next wave of wall-building in the Gubei Kou-Simatai area took place around the end of the fifteenth century. The Mongols raided Gubei Kou and points east and west in March of 1495, spurring the Chinese to consider how they could improve defenses where the Chao River penetrates the wall line.²⁹ Starting that fall, inspectors floated plans to strengthen fortifications in the area, and by 1501 at the latest, improvements were made in the wall itself.³⁰ These early Ming walls used border wall construction methods that had been in use since the Warring States period — dry fieldstone, and probably rammed earth. While the above materials were most prevalent, bricks and lime-based mortar were also used on a very limited basis at passes and major entry and exit points on the Great Wall.³¹ It is important to distinguish the use of bricks on the Great Wall, a less refined fortification designed to protect long stretches on the empire’s border, from the use of bricks in walled forts, which were better-built structures meant to aid in the defense of the relatively small areas enclosed within. The practice of using fired bricks on forts occurred as early as the beginning of the dynasty.³²

The Raid of 1550 and a fieldstone and mortar wall

As part of his decades-long quest for diplomatic recognition and trading rights with the Ming Empire, Altan Khan raided Gubei Kou on September 26 1550. According to one source, 60,000 Chinese were killed in this raid, 40,000 were taken prisoner, and millions of head of livestock were lost.³³ These figures are almost certainly exaggerated, but it is clear that it was a devastating raid in terms of loss of human life and property. One of the most important Chinese responses to this raid was to rebuild, starting in late 1550, extensive sections of the Ji-Chang border wall with stone and mortar, replacing the dry stone walls of the pre-1550 period.³⁴ The use of mortared walls allowed the Chinese to build on steeper, more easily defended slopes, and to more easily build features such as ramparts, crenels, and peepholes. (A significant exception to this phase of wall construction was that some of the walls in the Gubei Kou-Simatai region after the Raid of 1550 were made of rammed earth, perhaps because of a lack of available stone.³⁵) The newly-built mortared wall was soon put to the test in the Raid of 1554 on the Gubei Kou-Simatai region. The major overseer of the wall project and the Raid of 1554 defensive efforts in this area, Supreme Commander Yang Bo (杨博, 1509–1574) (somewhat self-servingly) quotes prisoners of war from the Mongol side who said that they thought that “getting in [in 1554] would be [as easy as] in 1550, but that to their surprise, the wall was

higher, the [Chinese] soldiers were fiercer, they knew how to use a bow and arrow, and they didn't give ground."³⁶

Brick wall towers

In September of 1567, the Supervising Secretary Wu Shilai (吴时来, *jinsi* 1553) recommended that Supreme Commander Tan Lun and Regional Commander (总兵) Qi Jiguang, who had distinguished themselves in the defense of China's southeast coast against pirate attacks, be brought to the northern border to improve defenses in that region.³⁷ In October of that same year, several Mongol groups took advantage of a new and inexperienced emperor to launch attacks in Shanxi, Xuanfu (宣府), and the Ji-Chang region. The emperor, alarmed, hastened to solicit opinions on northern border defense.³⁸ At the time, Tan Lun was serving as the Supreme Commander of Guangdong and Guangxi, and Qi Jiguang was the Fujian Regional Commander.³⁹ The two had worked together before in Zhejiang from 1555–1560, in Fujian from 1563–1564, and occasionally on the Guangdong-Fujian border from 1566–1567.⁴⁰ When they came north, Qi brought with him three thousand of his own troops who had been successful in fighting against pirates on the southeast coast; he also trained locally-based troops.⁴¹

To strengthen defenses near the capital, Tan and Qi suggested that the military improve the caliber of troops guarding the capital. They also proposed building brick towers along the wall in the Ji and Chang Defense Commands, including the Gubei Kou-Simatai area, starting in the spring of 1569.⁴² This was an important development in the history of wall tower construction. Most previous towers along the Great Wall were solid, with a small hut on top for a sentry to take shelter from the elements and Mongol arrows.⁴³ The Ji-Chang towers built starting in 1569 were hollow, allowing soldiers to live in them, store food, water, and weapons, and take shelter from Mongol arrows within the brick structure.⁴⁴ These towers were not, as some modern scholars have incorrectly claimed, the first to experiment with hollow interiors.⁴⁵ Such wall towers along the Great Wall actually had their origins in an experimental project by Grand Coordinator Wen Gui (文贵, 1449–c.1538)⁴⁶ in 1504 in the Yansui (延绥) Defense Command in Shaanxi.⁴⁷

Yet the scale of their proposed building scheme raised eyebrows in court and was by far the most controversial part of the Tan-Qi program. Their original proposal in early 1569 was to build 3000 brick towers along the Great Wall in the Ji and Chang Defense Commands.⁴⁸ Political opponents criticized the high cost of this project, arguing that the drain on military manpower would make China less secure. The Longqing emperor, Grand Secretary Zhang Juzheng (张居正), and Tan Lun all referred to unspecified rumormongers who incited opposition to the plan, though with the exception of the powerful Vice Minister of Rites Zhao Zhenji (赵贞吉, 1507–1576) it is not clear precisely who the opponents of this project were.⁴⁹ The influential Zhang Juzheng lobbied tirelessly for the project, leaving his “mouth and throat dry” from his advocacy.⁵⁰ Tan Lun and Qi Jiguang also did their own share of lobbying outside of court. Without the efforts of these three men, the project might not

have been approved.⁵¹ Probably most persuasive was the construction of three model towers by Qi Jiguang's younger brother, Qi Jimei (戚继美, active 1570–1582), along the Great Wall in the Dashui Yu (大水峪) valley, close to the Miyun garrison.⁵² According to Tan Lun, these model towers were critical in helping sway political opinion in favor of the tower-building project.⁵³ Because of concerns about project cost, the Ministry of War scaled back the number of towers to 1,200, but the project did go forward in 1569.⁵⁴ By the end of the year, 472 towers had already been built in the Ji-Chang region.⁵⁵

It took two years to finish the tower project in the Ji and Chang Defense Commands.⁵⁶ While towers were the primary focus during that period of time, wall-building did not completely stop. Given controversy over the project and its costs, it was not politically feasible to build labor-intensive towers and wall at the same time, so walls built from 1569 to 1576 largely followed the more conventional pattern of construction in the post-1550 era pioneered by the Ji-Chang Grand Coordinator Wu Jiahui (吳嘉會, 1512–1588): fieldstone and mortar in most regions, and rammed earth or fieldstone and mortar in the Gubei Kou-Simatai area.⁵⁷ In 1557, Wu Jiahui had been censured and then jailed on (largely trumped-up) charges of faulty and wasteful wall-building in the Ji-Chang region.⁵⁸ Tan and Qi were well aware of the political controversy surrounding Wu's wall-building. They were also aware that the later Supreme Commander of the Ji-Chang region, Liu Tao (劉燾, *jinsi* 1538) had learned a lesson from Wu's fate and minimized political attention to his wall-building projects by claiming that he was merely “building [wall] through non-building.”⁵⁹ Against this fraught backdrop, the ambitious tower-building project would never have succeeded were it not for Tan and Qi's keen political sensibilities and their careful application of lessons from the recent past.

Legitimacy and fragmentation of the Mongols during the Ming era

Turning away from the internal events of China, let us now consider the relations at the time among major Mongol groups. After the Mongol ruling family was driven out of China by Ming troops in 1368, the Mongols split up into three groups — the Oirat Mongols, the Eastern Mongols, and the Three Commanderies of Urianghka (usually transliterated as 兀良哈三衛, below, the “Three Commanderies”).⁶⁰ In this era of fragmented Mongol power, one of the most important qualifications for a Mongol leader was a bloodline that extended back to the Yuan dynasty emperors, via the first son of every generation to be considered a worthy candidate for leadership. Johan Elverskog points out that the Dayan Khan (1475?–1517?) successfully reset the genealogical reference point for later leaders, so that by the mid-sixteenth century it was sufficient for a male Mongol leader to claim direct descent from Dayan Khan, via the firstborn male in each generation.⁶¹

Several powerful Mongol leaders of the Ming era such as Esen and Altan Khan lacked this attribute, and the men who had the “right” genealogy usually lacked the military might to complement their bloodlines.⁶² To make up for their genealogical

deficiencies, these Mongol leaders looked to trading privileges for Chinese goods and diplomatic recognition by China to bolster their standing vis à vis other Mongol leaders.⁶³ When they could not obtain trading rights or recognition using peaceful means, they staged raids, not primarily to obtain goods, captives, and livestock, but mainly to put pressure on the Chinese court to grant them the rights and recognition that they sought. Both Esen's Raid of 1449 and Altan Khan's Raid of 1550 were designed to pressure the Chinese into establishing formal trade and diplomatic relations with them. After Altan Khan fought his way to the city walls of Beijing, instead of laying siege to the city or pursuing a primarily military goal, he presented yet another petition to the Chinese asking for trade and diplomatic relations.⁶⁴ Raiding *per se* was not the goal of Mongol leaders, as plunder went directly into the hands of low-level Mongol raiders without giving Mongol leaders an opportunity to redistribute these items.⁶⁵

In the mid-fifteenth century under Esen, the Oirat Mongols were the most powerful of the three Mongol groups mentioned above. From the rise of Dayan Khan in the late fifteenth century until the death of Altan Khan's grandson Cürüke (Ch. 扯力克, ?–1607) in 1607, the Eastern Mongols were the most powerful of the three major Mongol groups. Within this group, the rivalry between the Tumed Mongols, led by Altan Khan, and the Chakhar Mongols, led by Darayisun (Ch. 打来孙, 1520–1557), was an important underlying cause of major raids on Ming territory in the mid-sixteenth century.⁶⁶

Altan Khan was the more powerful of the two, as evidenced by his superior prowess in raiding the Chinese border and the successful pressure he brought to bear on of the Chakhar Mongols, causing them to migrate eastward in the 1540s.⁶⁷ Altan Khan hoped to use his power to unify the Mongols peoples, but was opposed by his younger brother "Old" Baghatur (Ch. 老把都, 1510–1572) and his own son Sengge (Ch. 辛爱 or 黄台吉, 1522–1586).⁶⁸ They believed that Altan Khan should use his power in the service of the genealogically legitimate khans Darayisun, and later his son and successor Tümen (Ch. 土蛮, 1539–1592).⁶⁹ Despite (and perhaps in part because of) this lack of legitimacy among the Mongols, Ming officials viewed Altan Khan as the Mongolian leader most capable of reining in other Mongol groups and preventing raids in return for the legitimacy and resources available to him from Chinese trade and diplomatic recognition. Just before the Ming established trade and diplomatic relations with Altan Khan in 1571, Supreme Commander Wang Chonggu (王崇古, 1515–1589) rationalized Altan Khan's role in controlling the Mongols as such:

Altan Khan is among the most senior Mongols. He has the power to maintain unity one of them, and they will submit themselves to him. In this situation, we can grant him the title of king, and give out titles to other chieftains after the manner of doing so for the Three Commanderies. This will show their subservience to us.⁷⁰

This conforms with the view of previous Supreme Commanders, such as Weng Wanda (翁万达, 1498–1552), who believed that the rivalry between Darayisun and

Altan Khan could be exploited to the advantage of the Chinese, thereby improving border security.⁷¹

The Three Commanderies Mongols and the Chakhar-Tumed rivalry

The Three Commanderies Mongols were much less powerful than the Oirat Mongols or the Eastern Mongols. Their pasturelands were located outside the eastern third of the Ming-era Chinese-Mongolian border. The sites of the commanderies themselves were located north and south of what is now the city of Qiqihar in Heilongjiang — the Fuyu Commandery (福余衛) was north of Qiqihar; the Duoyan Commandery (朵颜衛) was just south of that, and the Taining Commandery (泰宁衛) was even further south, just east of the modern Wulanhaote (乌兰浩特) in Inner Mongolia.⁷² The commanderies were composed of and led by Mongols who were first given their titles in 1389 by the Hongwu Emperor.⁷³ Eventually, the Duoyan tribe of the Three Commanderies dominated the other two tribes, so they were also known collectively to the Chinese as the Duoyan Three Commanderies (朵颜三衛).

Just as raiding Chinese territory was an important way for both the Chakhar Mongols and the Tumed Mongols to better position each side against the other, their rivalry also manifested itself in their respective incursions into Three Commanderies territory. Early in the sixteenth century, the Chakhar Mongols started to establish marriage alliances with the Three Commanderies.⁷⁴ Starting in the 1540s, under pressure from the west by the Tumed Mongols, the Chakhar Mongols began to migrate eastward. As they did so, they pushed up against the northern pasturelands of the Three Commanderies, bringing these tribes under their control.⁷⁵ Why the Chakhar Mongols brought the northern tribes, rather than the southern tribes, under their control was probably because of terrain. The terrain in the northern areas was flatter, whereas the southern areas just outside the wall were mountainous, enabling the Duoyan defenders to more easily defend themselves against outsiders.⁷⁶ After a difficult campaign by Sengge, the Duoyan leader Engke (Ch. 影克, active 1529–1566) submitted to the Tumed Mongols between 1548 and 1550, bringing portions of the southern areas of the Three Commanderies under Tumed control.⁷⁷ In 1551–1554, Sengge attacked Bayan Tegüs (Ch. 伯彥帖忽思, active 1541–1585), a Duoyan Commandery Assistant Commander (都指揮僉事) living 300 *li* outside of Gubei Kou,⁷⁸ and by the middle of 1555 he was brought under Tumed Mongol control.⁷⁹

The Three Commanderies as a middleman in the flow of military intelligence

The Three Commanderies were a critical link for both Chinese border defense and Eastern Mongol raids on the eastern third of the Great Wall. In the roughly one hundred and sixty years from 1398 to 1563, the Three Commanderies played critical roles in four southward attacks on Ming capitals — in 1398, 1449, 1550, and 1563 — by providing intelligence and manpower to further the attacks.⁸⁰ Taken alone, the

Three Commanderies did not have the military might to launch large raids on China. Yet because of their location just outside the Chinese border and next to the Eastern Mongols, they had ready access to intelligence valued by both the Chinese and the Eastern Mongols, for defense or offense respectively. Since the Three Commanderies were situated between China and the Eastern Mongols, it was difficult for Chinese spies to penetrate far enough into Mongol territory to get word about upcoming larger and more destructive Eastern Mongol raids. Therefore, the Chinese depended on the Three Commanderies to pass along this information.⁸¹ The Eastern Mongols needed intelligence about the eastern third of the Great Wall for the same reason that the Chinese needed information about upcoming Eastern Mongol attacks in this section — because the Three Commanderies occupied this territory, the Eastern Mongols had more difficulty gathering direct intelligence about where the Chinese were weak. Like the Chinese, the Eastern Mongols also depended on the Three Commanderies for this information.

From the Chinese perspective, this was at best an imperfect system of intelligence gathering, mainly because of the nature of large Mongol raiding parties. Since the Mongols were a nomadic people, they needed advance planning to organize a raid. Mongol leaders met months before a raid was to occur in order to agree upon the timing of and the jumping-off spot for the raid.⁸² The Raid of 1554, which happened at the end of the ninth moon of the year, was contemplated as early as the seventh moon of the year.⁸³ Because of the long lead time, Chinese spies or their Three Commanderies informants could often get word that a raid was planned, though accurate information about where the raid would occur was more difficult to obtain. Since the Mongols' main advantage was speed and surprise rather than numbers or organization, a successful raid depended on massing their men in a place where there were no Chinese defenders. One favored Mongol tactic was to spread false intelligence that would cause the Chinese troops to prepare to defend one section of the wall. The Mongols would then simply attack another, lightly defended section, easily breaching Chinese defenses. In the language of the time, this was called, “say you're attacking in the east but actually attack in the west” (声东击西).⁸⁴

Because the Eastern Mongols often disseminated false intelligence, the quality of intelligence that filtered through the Three Commanderies to the Chinese was often suspect. In the Raid of 1563, the Ji-Chang Supreme Commander Yang Zhao (杨兆, *jīnshì* 1556) believed the false intelligence propagated by the Mongols that their attack would occur in Panjia Kou (潘家口), far to the east of Beijing. Instead, the Eastern Mongols under Senge attacked on the eastern border of what is now Miyun District and easily broke through Chinese defenses.⁸⁵ However, there are also notable examples in which intelligence obtained by the Chinese played a key role in a successful defense. In 1554, a Three Commanderies chieftain called Hahachi (哈哈赤, active 1539–1554) by the Chinese passed on information about Eastern Mongol troop strength.⁸⁶ The accuracy of intelligence gathered by the Chinese usually depended on the intentions and loyalties of various Mongol leaders. Hahachi had close ties to Altan Khan, and helped provide information and support for the Raid of 1550.⁸⁷ As

a result, Hahachi may have been more willing to pass on information to the Chinese about the upcoming Raid of 1554, thus frustrating Darayisun's quest for power and influence vis-à-vis Altan Khan.

Border security before the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Women

From the spring of 1568, when Tan Lun and Qi Jiguang came to the capital area, and the summer of 1576, the situation on the northern border had changed dramatically from the middle of the century, when Altan Khan and his competitors led large raids on central and eastern sections of the Great Wall. Most importantly, the Ming court decided in 1571 to reverse a thirty-year old policy of a prohibition on trade and diplomatic relations with the Eastern Mongols.⁸⁸ The main reason for reversing this policy was to end Altan Khan's incessant attacks on the northern border.⁸⁹ Second, border security had improved as a result of Tan and Qi's efforts mentioned above.⁹⁰

Border security had also improved in the Ji-Chang region because the Ming government had reallocated defense resources from other border regions and had adopted a stricter standard for defense objectives in the capital region. Prior to 1550, the most serious threats to national security were from Mongols breaking through the Xuanfu-Datong-Shanxi border regions and approaching the capital itself from the west: Esen approached Beijing through Zijing Pass (紫荆關) in 1449; during several raids in the 1540s, Altan Khan's forces penetrated well into what is now Shanxi Province, near the western approach to the capital. However, after Beijing was attacked in the northeast at Gubei Kou 1550, the Ming court began to significantly increase defense resources in this region. The post of Supreme Commander for the Ji-Chang region (who also oversaw the Liaodong and Baoding regions) was established in 1550, taking the Baoding region away from the portfolio of the Xuanfu-Datong-Shanxi Supreme Commander (總督宣大山西), whose region became less important after that time.⁹¹ Defense expenditures in the Ji-Chang region also increased rapidly in the post-1550 period.⁹² In 1567, Yang Bo suggested that the standard in border defense in the Ji-Chang region should be to "not let a single [Mongolian] horse in" (匹馬不入). In other regions such as Xuan-Da-Shanxi and Liaodong, he suggested that it was enough to simply prevent the Mongols from looting after they had penetrated the border.⁹³ This high standard of defense for the Ji-Chang region continued until at least the last years of the Wanli reign.⁹⁴

For the above reasons, the frequency of raids in the Ji-Chang area had declined dramatically by the early 1570s. Altan Khan's last major raid on Chinese territory before 1571 was in the fall of 1567 in Shanxi.⁹⁵ Other raids by the Three Commanderies on the Ji-Chang border declined in frequency after 1571, with the last major raid also occurring in the fall of 1567.⁹⁶ This situation changed in 1575, when the Duoyan leader Jüngnon (Ch. 長昂, active 1575–1612) raided Dongjia Kou (董家口). Qi Jiguang was successful in defending against this raid, and even captured Jüngnon's uncle Jongtu (Ch. 長禿, active 1561–1575) outside of the wall.⁹⁷ While China had been attacked, the border was still secure from intrusions.

Sengge's scorned wife the Great *Beyiji* and her sibling Chaoman the Younger

Sengge's pastures were located outside the wall from Zhangjiakou, relatively close to the western edge of the Three Commanderies and not far from the eastern third of the Great Wall. As a result, he had close relations with the Duoyan tribe.⁹⁸ He and his father both sought to form alliances by marrying daughters of Duoyan officials, and by marrying their own daughters to Duoyan leaders.⁹⁹ (The highest-status Duoyan chieftains were permitted to marry daughters of Eastern Mongol leaders; those with lower status could marry their daughters to Eastern Mongol nobility.¹⁰⁰) One purpose of these alliances was to secure the help of the Three Commanderies for Eastern Mongol raids on the eastern third of the Great Wall, the southern border of the area occupied by the Three Commanderies. They knew the terrain and where the Chinese might be weak, so they could serve as guides and advisors for these raids. These alliances worked both ways, as the Three Commanderies were often able to secure the assistance of the Eastern Mongols in retaliating when the Three Commanderies were attacked by the Chinese or their leaders were taken prisoner. For example, when Sengge's Three Commanderies father-in-law Tong Han (通汉) was taken prisoner by the Chinese, Sengge retaliated by launching the Raid of 1563.¹⁰¹

One of Sengge's earlier wives was known as the Great *Beyiji* (Ch. 大嬖只, active ?–1587)¹⁰² According to Serruys, *beyiji* is the Mongolian pronunciation of the Chinese word 妃子; he translates the word as it is used in Mongolian as “princess.”¹⁰³ Guo Zaoqing and Mi Wanchun both refer to *beyiji* as “concubines” (妾) of Mongol chieftains, but they may be using this as a pejorative form for wife simply because they are referring to the “uncivilized” Mongols.¹⁰⁴ In contemporary Chinese usage of these Mongol terms, *beyiji* actually seems to have indicated a higher status than a concubine.¹⁰⁵ Wada Sei views *beyiji* as a term used for a wife other than the khatun (empress).¹⁰⁶ Since at the time Sengge could in no way claim to be a khan, “princess” is adequate here for our understanding of the position and status of the Great *Beyiji*.

The personal name of Sengge's “Great *Beyiji*” or her order of marriage among Sengge's wives is unknown. It is important to realize that here the 大 is used by the Chinese to differentiate her in seniority from another *beyiji* and wife of Sengge's, the 小嬖只 or “Lesser *Beyiji*,” and does not necessarily indicate her seniority among all of Sengge's wives.¹⁰⁷ Both of the *beyiji* are descendants of Qotong (Ch. 花当, ?–1527); the Great *Beyiji* is a third- or fourth-generation descendant and the Lesser *Beyiji* a fourth-generation descendant (via a younger son) of Qotong.¹⁰⁸

The Great *Beyiji* was a daughter of Bayan Tegüs' aunt Bahazhen (Ch. 把哈真).¹⁰⁹ Bayan Tegüs brought Bahazhen into his own household and married her, though it is not clear whether the Great *Beyiji* was a daughter of this union.¹¹⁰ Assuming that the Great *Beyiji* is the full sister of Bahazhen's three sons by Bayan Tegüs, this reading would make her the half-sister of Bayan Tegüs' second son by his other wife Aizhilun (Ch. 挨只伦), Chaoman the Younger (Ch. 炒蛮, occasionally 少炒蛮 or 小炒蛮 active 1561–1579), a key figure in the Raid of 1576. However if the Great *Beyiji*

was not Bayan Tegüs' daughter, then she and Chaoman the Younger were first cousins once removed. Given that after her abandonment by Sengge, the Great *Beyiji* went to live with her brother Aitaibi (Ch. 挨台必) and not Chaoman the Younger suggests that the second reading may be more plausible. Aitaibi was the eldest son of the Great *Beyiji*'s mother Bahazhen, which the *Lulong Sailue* lists as Ayatai (Ch. 阿牙台).¹¹¹ Additional evidence of close kinship between Aitaibi and the Great *Beyiji* comes from an incident in the summer of 1579. While making amends to the Chinese outside the wall at Gubei Kou for their attack on the Caojia Lu (曹家路) area east of Simatai, Aitaibi used a ruse to get his half-brother Chaoman the Younger to suddenly retreat north in case the Chinese tried to attack the Great *Beyiji*.¹¹² Confusingly, Chen Di (陳第, 1541–1617) states that the daughter of the Great *Beyiji* is the aunt of Chaoman the Younger, which I am unable to reconcile with the above information.¹¹³

I use the appellation “Chaoman the Younger” to distinguish him from an older contemporary of his with the same name. Such a name has some basis in the Chinese terminology of the time, as he was occasionally called by them 小炒蛮 or 少炒蛮.¹¹⁴ “Chaoman the Elder,” as I call him, was the grandson of Qotong, the first son of Hahachi, who himself was the first son of Qotong's third wife.¹¹⁵ He lived outside the border of the eastern sections of the Ji Defense Command, and as a result was sometimes called in Chinese sources the “Eastern Chaoman.” (東炒蛮)¹¹⁶ Chaoman the Younger was a great-great grandson of Qotong, and was active in western sections of the Ji Defense Command outside Gubei Kou, near the base of his father Bayan Tegüs.¹¹⁷ Chaoman the Younger has a biography in Chapter 13 of the *Wanli Wugong Lu*. Some of the material in this biography depicts someone who was very helpful in passing information to the Chinese in eastern sections of the Ji Defense Command in the early Longqing period. Given that Chaoman the Elder's father Hahachi was interested in passing along information to the Chinese particularly when it would hurt Darayisun in 1554, I suspect that this material actually pertains to Chaoman the Elder.¹¹⁸

Sengge and the Great *Beyiji* probably married in the mid-1550s, soon after Sengge had brought the Great *Beyiji*'s people (a part of the Duoyan Commandery), led by Bayan Tegüs, under his control.¹¹⁹ At some point he abandoned her, and she went back to live near or with her brother Aitaibi, who lived several hundred *li* outside Gubei Kou.¹²⁰ The Great *Beyiji* was not the only Three Commanderies woman acquired and scorned by him — at one time, Sengge's retinue had included several tens or even more than one hundred of these women, including the Lesser *Beyiji* and the Baotu *Beyiji*. He became overextended and could not support his entire retinue, so he sent them back to their places of origin, near western sections of the Ji Defense Command border and eastern sections of the Xuan Defense Command border.¹²¹ The exact relationship between these women and Sengge is unclear. According to the *Wanli Wugong Lu*, he had five wives and one concubine, making it unlikely that any of the “100 plus” women were either wives or concubines.¹²² Tao Wangling (陶望齡, 1562–1609) describes Sengge as quickly going through several wives in the early 1570s:

In the beginning, Sengge married [his first wife], and she gave birth to Cürüke Khan. She fell out of favor, and then he married the mother of the Dacheng *tayiji*. A wife gave birth to Urüd-bâtur *tayiji*, she lost her looks, and he abandoned her, taking over 10,000 of her men and some of his other offspring by secondary wives.¹²³

From the above, it seems by abandoning a wife and appropriating some of her men, he was in fact strengthening his own forces. One of Sengge's reasons for acquiring these women was to form military alliances; the other had to do with baser motivations. According to the author of the *Wanli Wugong Lu*, Sengge "dissipated himself with wine and women, spending all day groaning in bed."¹²⁴ The practice of abandoning wives who went back to their own people near the Gubei Kou border region was also not unique to Sengge — Altan Khan's younger brother "Old" Baghatur's wife Monkejin (Ch. 猛可真, active 1587–1589) was also abandoned by him and she went back to live outside the Chinese border near Caojia Lu.¹²⁵

While these women had lost the companionship of their former husband or benefactor, they were not without a way to make a living back among their own people. Since the early sixteenth century, the Ming government had been giving cloth, grain, iron pots, and silver to the Three Commanderies. These payments were partly bribes given in return for not attacking China, and were therefore controversial from the Chinese side. In theory, the Three Commanderies were also supposed to serve as buffer states to shield the Chinese border from the more powerful Eastern Mongols further to the north and west.¹²⁶ The payments were also partly given for intelligence provided by the Three Commanderies about upcoming attacks by the Eastern Mongols.¹²⁷

The payments, euphemistically called *fushang* (抚赏) by the Chinese, were to be given twice a year, at specific places, to specific Three Tribes subgroups, and in specified amounts.¹²⁸ For example, *fushang* in the Xuan Defense Command (宣镇) was to be given twice a year, at Yongning Fort (永寧城) and the Longmen Battalion (龍門所).¹²⁹ The practice of giving *fushang*, which started no later than the 1530s, was controversial in part because it could allow the Three Commanderies Mongols to spy on Chinese installations.¹³⁰ The Chinese hoped that this investment in buying off the Mongols would be less costly than defense expenditures necessary to guard against Mongols who were not bribed.¹³¹ Though it was acceptable to the Chinese to increase *fushang* for good behavior, the Three Commanderies Mongols were often successful in using threats to increase their *fushang*.¹³² The incentive system for border officials was such that even a small raid where a soldier or a few civilians were killed or taken prisoner could affect the pay and career of those officials.¹³³ If the Three Commanderies did not get the additional *fushang* that they wanted, it was easy for them to launch a small retaliatory raid. To prevent these raids, border officials would spare no effort to give the Three Commanderies Mongols what they wanted, even if it meant raising funds through cutting and selling firewood, skimming from monies earmarked for the soldiers' pay, or illegally hiring out soldiers to local landowners.¹³⁴ Supreme Commander Wang Chonggu writes that in 1571, 13,000 *liang* of silver was budgeted for *fushang* in the Ji-Chang area, but commanders supplemented this

amount with another 20,000 *liang* from soldiers' pay.¹³⁵ Taking money from the soldiers to pay for off-budget *fushang* was a risky defensive strategy, because soldiers in this situation often deserted.¹³⁶

The divorced Great *Beyiji* and others in her position significantly aided the efforts of their fellow tribesmen to extort more *fushang* payments from Chinese border commanders. Tomor suggests that the *fushang* system itself may have even had the effect of attracting former wives of Sengge and their children to the border, thus increasing the population of Mongols just outside the Chinese border.¹³⁷ These scorned women accompanied their male tribesmen to the Chinese border, soliciting *fushang* on behalf of their husband Sengge.¹³⁸ Border commanders knew that these women were the wives (though not necessarily that they were scorned) of Sengge, making these extortion efforts more successful.¹³⁹ In fact, there seemed to be some confusion on the Chinese side about the exact status of the relationship between Great *Beyiji* and Sengge. The contemporary sources vary, with some saying that they were married, and others indicating that she was married to Chaoman the Younger.¹⁴⁰

The implicit or explicit threat was that if the women and their male tribesmen did not receive the additional *fushang* payments they were seeking, the fierce and much-feared warrior Sengge might attack in retaliation. In the case of Chaoman the Younger, whose men were behind the Raid of 1576, he used his status as a brother-in-law of Sengge to ask for more *fushang* and raid the border with impunity.¹⁴¹ In 1579, Chinese scouts learned that if Sengge's wife did not get a large increase in *fushang* payments, her people would work with Sengge.¹⁴² Other Duoyan wives of Eastern Mongol nobility took advantage of this connection to boost their status, and as a result the Chinese could not afford to stint on *fushang* payments to them as well.¹⁴³ Chen Di describes the splendor of the goods available as *fushang* to give to the Great *Beyiji*:

I had never seen the practice of *fushang* before, and seeing it gave me a feeling of unspeakable sadness and anger. Long-sleeved robes (通袖), golden satin, cloth, and other fineries were stacked up in mounds. Cattle, sheep, millet, and flour were present in innumerable quantities. The [Great] *Beyiji* would come with her three hundred plus cavalry, and feeding them would consume forty to fifty ounces of silver a day. Her language was disrespectful, and her requests knew no bounds. If the *fushang* was supposed to be cloth, she would ask for golden satin. If the *fushang* was supposed to be golden satin, she would ask for long-sleeved robes. If one hundred were supposed to be seated at tables, she would ask to add two or three hundred extra seats. This was simply her way of doing things, and the generals would just give in to her demands.¹⁴⁴

After her initial scorning by Sengge, the Great *Beyiji* chose to join her brother Ayatai and father Bayan Tegüs outside of Gubei Kou. Ayatai had the advantage of the Chinese-granted title of Assistant Commander, which was among the highest-ranking titles granted to Three Commanderies Mongols.¹⁴⁵ While she lived near or with Ayatai (the first son of Bayan Tegüs by his second wife, the Great *Beyiji*'s

mother), the Great *Beyiji* decided to ally herself with Ayatai's half-brother Chaoman the Younger. Her status as a senior wife of Sengge makes it understandable why Chaoman the Younger would pursue her as an ally in extracting *fushang* from the Chinese near Gubei Kou.¹⁴⁶ She probably chose to ally herself with him, rather than her brother Ayatai, because of Chaoman the Younger's higher status among the Mongols as a son-in-law of Sengge.¹⁴⁷ In addition, Chaoman the Younger was clearly the more senior of the two, as he was already a Battalion Commander (正千户) before being promoted to Assistant Commander in 1565, while his half-brother Ayatai who was also promoted to this same rank at the same time, did not previously hold a Chinese-granted title.¹⁴⁸

The Raid of 1576

For a time, the scorned wife of Sengge and Chaoman the Younger were successful in extracting *fushang* from Chinese commanders at Gubei Kou.¹⁴⁹ However, sometime during or before the summer of 1576, their requests were refused. After this second scorning of the Great *Beyiji* (this time by the Chinese) on the rainy night of July 6 1576 Chaoman led his men in a retaliatory raid of seventy men up a path created by Chinese soldiers to cut wood outside the border and through the wall at Falcon Gap.¹⁵⁰ A short section of fieldstone and mortar wall, similar to the walls built in the post-1550 period and which was probably part of the wall structure existing in 1576, remains today on the inner edge of the Falcon Gap pass.¹⁵¹

After penetrating the wall, the Mongol raiders quickly attacked a small fort called Falcon Gap Fort (鴉鵲庵寨) just inside the gap. To get someone to open the door, they pretended that they were soldiers from the Yansui Defense Command looking to spend the night.¹⁵² (Since Yansui soldiers frequently served as reinforcements in the Ji Defense Command during the peak spring and fall defense seasons, this ploy was not as far-fetched as it might seem.) Once inside the fort, they made straight for the sleeping area, killing ten people, wounding six, and making off with thirteen others. By this time, the soldiers in the signal towers had set off the alarm, alerting the Assistant Regional Commander (参将) Yuan Zongru (苑宗儒, active 1570–1576), who rushed to the scene of the attack with over 100 soldiers. The Mongols saw that they needed to flee and crossed back over the wall using the same route that they took to get in. In doing so, they were pursued by Chinese soldiers, who followed them outside the wall. There, the Mongols had set an ambush. To make the scene look even more natural to their pursuers, the Mongolians had set out cattle and horses to seem as if they were idly grazing. Yuan Zongru captured a female Mongol, four head of cattle, and some millet. The Chinese pursued the Mongols further, to a place called Shelazhi (舍喇智) and into the Mongolian ambush. Eleven soldiers were killed in the ambush, including Yuan Zongru, and the war hero and former Regional Commander in charge of the Guangdong region, Tang Kekuan (汤克宽, active 1552–1576), though most of the soldiers were able to break out of the ambush and make it back to safety.¹⁵³ Chen Di believed that this raid was masterminded by an ethnic Chinese go-between (通事)

of Chaoman's whose surname was Li, just as after the Raid of 1550, the Chinese blamed a Chinese person from Gansu named Shi Jin 史进 (Mongol name Ha Zhouer 哈舟儿) and a Chinese named Chen Zhi 陳志 (a.k.a. Chen Tongshi 陳通事) for guiding Altan Khan.¹⁵⁴

Aftermath of the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Women

The immediate aftermath of the raid followed the pattern of other small, successful Mongol raids. Qi Jiguang and Grand Coordinator Wang Yi'e (王一鶚, *jinshi* 1553) had their salaries docked for three months.¹⁵⁵ Fearing a counterattack by the Chinese, Chaoman and the Great *Beyiji* fled the Gubei Kou area to the region just outside Dushi Kou (独石口), outside the border near the Xuan Defense Command.¹⁵⁶ In the eleventh moon of that year, Chaoman and the Great *Beyiji* led one thousand of their people to the border. Their emissary tried to explain away the incident as an unauthorized action by a small group of Mongols, making the face-saving claim that the ambush was actually an act of self-defense. The Mongols surrendered the putative leader of the raid, Aduchi (阿都赤) and sixteen others, and they gave back nineteen captives and twenty-one horses taken in the raid. After this, the Chinese resumed the *fushang* payments to Chaoman's tribe and put Aduchi's head and those of the other perpetrators on a stake outside of Falcon Gap.¹⁵⁷ Because of Chaoman and the Great *Beyiji*'s relation by marriage to Sengge, the Chinese thought it wise not to take further retaliatory action.¹⁵⁸ The Mongols' calculus had proved correct — with her perceived close ties to Sengge, the Chinese did not dare to anger the Great *Beyiji* by cutting off her *fushang* payments. The Great *Beyiji* led more raids in the 1580s, and was considered one of the "Six Scourges" of the border in that period, along with the Lesser *Beyiji*, "Old" Baghatur's scorned wife Monkejin, Chaoman the Younger, Dong Huli (Ch. 董狐狸, active 1574–1595), and Jüngnon.¹⁵⁹ After most of these raids, the Chinese nonetheless quickly resumed her *fushang* payments.¹⁶⁰

While the quantity of human and material losses of this raid was not great, it stirred considerable discussion among Ming officials.¹⁶¹ First, it was the first significant breach of border defenses since 1567. Second, the death of an Assistant Regional Commander in a Three Commanderies Mongol raid was a provocation that the Chinese took very seriously. In 1515, the death of the Assistant Regional Commander Chen Qian (陳乾) in a border raid on a pass in the eastern part of the Ji Defense Command provoked the Chinese into demanding the head of the perpetrator, which the Duoyan chieftain Qotong produced.¹⁶²

The most obvious outcome of the 1576 Raid of the Scorned Mongol Women was the construction of brick wall in the Gubei Kou-Simatai region starting in 1577.¹⁶³ We know that bricks were used to replace the mostly rammed earth wall in this region starting that fall, as bricks stamped with the dates of the fifth and sixth years of the Wanli reign (1577 and 1578) have been found in this area, either on or off the wall.¹⁶⁴ Two versions of the same 1578 text also refer to brick wall construction:

[In 1576], there was first discussion of tearing down old wall and building new wall. The new wall was higher than the old one, and used *sanbetu* [三合土, an early kind of concrete made of lime, broken clay tiles, and sand]¹⁶⁵ for its core. The ramparts on both sides of the wall were built of brick and held together with lime mortar. These walls should be as durable as brick forts in along the border and in the interior of the empire.¹⁶⁶

This passage is the only one of the hundreds of memorials in *Sizhen Sanguan Zhi* reprinted in its entirety, which probably reflects that Liu Xiaozu saw it as important to include in full, or as important enough to add after most of the original manuscript was completed.¹⁶⁷ A more specific record of the deliberations mentioned above about tearing down the old wall and building a new one is almost surely no longer extant, and other available information does not explicitly indicate that the Raid of 1576 was the direct proximate cause of rebuilding the wall with brick that fall. This is not surprising, because Ming dynasty materials very rarely mention the building materials used on the Great Wall.

Nonetheless, the totality of the information still available to us does indicate that the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman was at least an important motivation for the rebuilding of sections of wall in brick the next year. The wall and the towers were not undertaken at the same time in the period of towerbuilding between 1569 and 1576 because it would have exceeded the capabilities of the army to complete the two projects concurrently.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, by the 1570s, it was thus a matter of when, not whether, sections of wall would be rebuilt with brick. Given that the Ming government wanted to improve the defenses in the Simatai area in response to this raid, brick may have been the only practical way to improve on the previously existing rammed earth wall. A skillfully constructed fieldstone and mortar wall has the same shape and function as a brick wall. However, it is quite likely that sufficient stones to build such a wall were not available in this area. In the post-1550 wall rebuilding, most of the walls were built with fieldstone and mortar, with the notable exception of stretches in the Gubei Kou-Simatai region, probably for this very reason.¹⁶⁹ When the Chinese defenders again wanted to improve their fortifications following the 1576 raid, brick may have been the only practical way in that region to upgrade from the previous wall.¹⁷⁰

In addition, the importing of soldiers from the south by Tan Lun and Qi Jiguang in 1568 may have also contributed to the know-how necessary to resurface pre-existing walls with brick. Chen Di commented on late 1570s brick wall-building in the Gubei Kou area, saying:

This project is unique. It seems that [craftsmen] south of the Yangtze know how to face a wall in brick and stone but not how to make an earth core; walls from the north are made of earth, without brick and stone. The current project has both, and is constructed in such a way as to last for a long time.¹⁷¹

Finally, there is also an apparent temporal link between the raid and the start of brick wall construction — these rebuilding projects commenced in 1577, directly after the Raid of 1576. Chen Renxi (陳仁錫, 1581–1636) even states that there were causal

links between the rebuilding of border walls in brick and Mongol raids in the 1570s (though he is not specific as to which raid(s) were the impetus for the project).¹⁷² For these reasons, it is reasonable to view the initiative to rebuild important sections (including the very section affected in that raid) as a direct response to the Raid of 1576.

Rebuilding of key sections of wall in brick was not limited to the Gubei Kou-Simatai area. In the Ji-Chang area, the initial rebuilding of key sections in brick was continued in the 1580s at Badaling (八达岭) and Qiangzi Ling (墙子岭).¹⁷³ In 1592, Tōtōyomi Hideyoshi (丰臣秀吉, 1537–1598) overran Korea. China made the same security calculation then that it did in the 1950s — that a small border state controlled by a powerful enemy was unacceptable — so it intervened in this conflict on behalf of Korea starting in 1593.¹⁷⁴ The Japanese and Chinese fought two campaigns before the Japanese finally withdrew in 1598.¹⁷⁵ During this time, significant financial and manpower resources that might have otherwise been used for wall-building were occupied in Korea.¹⁷⁶ As a result, wall-building in the Ji and Chang regions nearly came to a standstill during the 1590s and did not resume until the first decade of the seventeenth century. After that point, brick wall-building commenced anew, and continued through the last years of the Ming dynasty.¹⁷⁷

The main advances in Ming wall-building before the Raid of 1576 — mortar in the fieldstone wall and brick towers along the wall — both came about as a result of the pressure on the capital region from the Eastern Mongols. The decision to rebuild sections of wall with brick, the next advance, followed a raid instigated by the Duoyan Mongols. This group became more powerful after the withdrawal of the Tumed Mongols from their territory, but it never turned into a serious threat to Ming security in the capital region. Even so, this minor enemy of the Ming state was responsible for precipitating the campaign of rebuilding wall in brick along key sections of the eastern third of the Great Wall.

Simatai today

The Simatai section of the Great Wall was restored in the mid-1980s and opened to the public in 1988. Tourists usually begin their journey eastward up the wall where the Tang He (汤河) stream (a tributary of the Chao River) flows southward through the ridge. Continuing further, the visitor finds that the ridge narrows and the grade increases so much that the management of this tourist area has put signs and a guard at the end of the restored area to prevent intrepid tourists from going further. Adventurous climbers who bribe their way around the guard, wait until he is off duty, or find another route then cross over the natural bridge that forms Kulong Shan, arrive at Falcon Gap, and climb the steep Stairway to Heaven to reach the high point of the Simatai ridge. Between the Stairway to Heaven and the highest point on the ridge, called Wangjing Lou (望京楼) by locals, is a stretch of wall just over a foot wide, surrounded by steep dropoffs. Regardless how far tourists progress along the wall, they are struck by the steepness of the terrain. A nearly universal refrain of

visitors to Simatai is “Why did they even need to build a wall in terrain so steep?” The answer, of course, is — “The Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman.”

Significance and implications

The Raid of 1576 occurred against the background of the complex relations among the Eastern Mongols, the Three Commanderies, and the Ji-Chang Defense Command of the Ming dynasty. Sengge divorced the Great *Beyiji*, who together with Chaoman the Younger, leveraged their special relationships with both the Eastern Mongols and the Chinese to their maximum advantage. When their requests for *fushang* were rebuffed, they raided, which in turn prompted the Chinese to commence previously contemplated brick improvements in the Great Wall. We can draw several broader conclusions about the significance of this chain of events. One, seemingly insignificant acts of aggression by even a minor aggressor can have a far-reaching effect on the other side’s actions. Two, it is important for the historian to understand in context seemingly unrelated links in an overall chain of causation. Mongols raided because they did not get the additional *fushang* payments they asked for, and Chinese defenders carried out a pre-existing plan to improve their wall because of this raid. Here, the overall strategic goals of each side were quite different, and not directly related: Mongol leaders sought political power through Chinese resources and recognition, and the Chinese wanted border security. By examining this raid in the context of Mongol and Chinese strategic objectives, we can better understand how the Raid of the Scorned Mongol Woman forever changed the appearance of the most popular sections of the Great Wall.

Notes

- ¹ I thank Jonathan Ball for reminding me that Sengge’s wife was scorned by both her husband and the Chinese officers in command of Gubei Kou, thus making her twice-scorned.
- ² Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 35–36.
- ³ 曹永年《蒙古民族通史》第三卷。呼和浩特: 内蒙古大学出版社 (2002), p. 303. Unless otherwise noted, all birth and death dates and dates of *jinsbi* degrees are based on the *Dictionary of Ming Biography* or the《明人传记资料索引》。Where neither the birth or death dates nor the year of a person’s *jinsbi* degree are known, I have provided dates when they were publicly active, as evidenced by mention of their name in《明实录》。
- ⁴ 白翠琴《瓦剌史》。桂林: 广西师范大学出版社 (2006), p. 65.
- ⁵ Prior to 1551, the Ji Defense Command stretched from Shanhaiguan on the coastline to the Yongding River (永定河, called the Hun He 浑河 in Ming times) west of Beijing. After Altan Khan’s Raid of

1550, which included an attempt to loot the tombs of the ruling house in Changping, the Chang Defense Command was hived off from the Ji region. The Chang Defense Command’s eastern terminus was Mutianyu, in Beijing’s Huairou District, and extended to the Yongding River. The Chang region was somewhat of a special case, in that unlike other Defense Commands, it did not have its own Grand Coordinator (*xunfu*) until the late 1630s — the Ji region Grand Coordinator administered both regions. As a result, it is reasonable for most purposes to continue to view the Ji and Chang region as a single region even after 1551. On the date of the Chang region spinoff, see《明世宗实录》370/6610–6611; this event was also referred to in 艾冲《论明十三镇长城的起止点和结合部》,《陕西师大学报 (哲学社会科学版)》22.2 (May 1993), 89. On appointments of Grand Coordinators in the Ji and Chang regions, see 吴廷燮《明督抚年表》,北京: 中华书局 (1982), pp. 20–47, 699. References to pre-modern sources in this and following notes are given in the format [chapter]/

[page number], where the page number refers to the earliest extant edition. For references to the *Ming Shi Lu*, page numbers refer to those in the Academia Sinica edition; references to the official dynastic histories use page numbers from the Zhonghua Shuju edition. Some of the searching of the *Ming Shi Lu* in preparation of this article used the Academia Sinica Institute of History's proprietary 汉籍电子文献资料库 [Electronic Database of Chinese Texts], and I express here my gratitude for the opportunity to use this extraordinary research aid. Some of the other searches were done with the immense and very helpful 《中国基本古籍库》 [Database of Basic Chinese Texts] as well as the *Ming Qing Shi Li* databases compiled by 北京爱如生数字化技术研究中心 [Eruson].

⁶ Cheng Dalin, *The Great Wall of China* (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Publications Division, 1984), p. 61.

⁷ The Huangya Guan section of wall in modern-day Ji Xian (蓟县), Tianjin Municipality was bricked over in the spring of 1591. (方放《天津黄崖关长城志》, 天津: 天津古籍出版社 (1988), p. 26.) The author does not identify the passage used to show that the Ji Defense Command wall in general was rebuilt with brick in the Wanli reign, but it appears that their source was 《四镇三关志》7/252A. A very similar version of this passage also appears in 《戚少保年谱》11/36B (This passage is quoted in note 57.) Fang Fang, p. 25. Official titles, names of government departments, and administrative units are translated according to Charles Hucker's *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1985).

⁸ 杨淑英《明代蓟昌边墙之建置》, 《[天津]大公报·史地周刊》, July 31 1931, p. 11.

⁹ Waldron, chs 6 and 8.

¹⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 183–215.

¹¹ See, for example, the high proportion of memorials by Supreme Commanders and Grand Coordinators in 《四镇三关志》7/100–360.

¹² See 《明世宗实录》501/8288: “抚夷之资: 户部给银七千两, 兵部给银三千两”; 《明穆宗实录》10/275 “凡各镇以此请者, 以十分为率: 户部给十之七, 兵部给十之三, 永为定例”; 李汶《总督三边奏议》17/44B《恭报宁夏镇河西边工全完息乞圣明甄别效劳官员以励人心疏》: “该兵部复: 本部出三分, 动支马价银一万三百九十五两七钱二分七厘五毫; 户部应出七分。”

¹³ 《史记》88/2565–66《蒙恬传》: “始皇二十六年[221 BC]...筑长城, 因地形, 用制险塞, 起临洮, 至辽东, 延袤万余里。”

¹⁴ 《北齐书》4/64《帝纪·四》: “是年, 于长城内筑重城, 自库洛拔而东至于均纥戍, 凡四百余里。”

¹⁵ On a short Ming wall-building project in the 1550s, see 阿伦 [David Spindler]《潮河关猪嘴寨长城考》

(一), <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=73742&forumid=1>, (二) <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=73746&forumid=1>, (三) <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=73747&forumid=1>, posted November 10 2006. On another short wall-building project in the 1610s, see Peter Hessler, “Walking the Wall,” *The New Yorker*, May 21 2007, p. 59.

¹⁶ 晋宏逵主编《司马台长城》, 北京: 北京燕山出版社 (1992), p. 17, referencing 周绍林《司马台一带地质构造特征及冷热泉的形成》(unpublished paper).

¹⁷ Calculations based on data appearing in Jin Hongkui, p. 1.

¹⁸ 北京密云司马台风景区编《司马台长城旅游手册》, p. 41.

¹⁹ Two nearby place names 窟窿山 and 杨坡顶, are still used in modern times. (Author interview of 巴各庄 villagers, September 16 2004.) According to 瞿九思《万历武功录》ch. 13《妙蛮传》p. 13A, 鸦鹤安 is located between the two spots: “鸦鹤山西尽窟窿, 东尽卢家安杨木顶, 长可六里。” Based on this information, I was able to locate 鸦鹤安 in the field. I have consulted Buyanhuu's (薄音湖)《明代蒙古汉籍史料汇编》第四辑《瞿九思·万历武功录(蒙古女真人物传记选)》, 内蒙古大学出版社: 呼和浩特, (2007) in punctuating this and other quotations from *Wanli Wugong Lu*.

²⁰ For a proof that the Northern Qi dynasty did build wall in northern Miyun County, see 阿伦 [David Spindler]《黑谷关外长城修筑时间线索》(二) <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=76368&forumid=1> and (三) <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=76369&forumid=1>, posted January 2 2007. On Ming wall-building in the Gubei Kou area, see below.

²¹ See, for example, 熊明遇《掖草》1/1B《为敬循职掌备陈疆事仰祁圣明振长策祛积病以裨安攘事》“今蓟边乃魏国公徐达所建之内藩, 而戚继光为之完缮者也” (1615); 郑大郁《经国雄略》2/5A《边塞考》: “太祖...命魏国公徐达起古北口, 至山海关, 增修关隘, 以为内边。”(明末); 罗哲文主编《长城百科全书》, 长春: 吉林人民出版社, (1994), p. 664. 谢鼎然《徐达未修过长城》, 《历史月刊》139 (August 1999), 129–31.

²² 《明太祖实录》81/1465–66: “淮安侯华云龙镇守北平, 遣使言: 塞上诸关东自永平、蓟州、密云, 西至五灰岭外隘口, 通一百二十一处, 相去约二千二百里。其王平口至官坐岭口关隘有九, 约去五百余里, 俱系冲要之地, 宜设兵守之...从之。” A similar passage also appears in 《明史》91/2235《兵志三》; all are cited in Waldron, p. 78. The *Ming Shi Lu* incorrectly renders 灰岭 as 五灰岭, while the *Ming Shi* uses the correct place name. In this area, there is no 五灰岭; 灰岭 is the name used for 镇边城 before 1521. (《明世宗实录》2/76: “议名灰岭口曰镇边城”) There is another 灰岭 east of 居庸关, though given the proximity of the above 灰岭 to Wangping Kou, it is almost certain that this is the area to which Hua Yunlong

- refers. Waldron is correct to point out that not all of the places mentioned were on the lines of future walls, though this is only true for the section between Wangping Kou and the western reaches of the modern Mentougou District in western Beijing. He is incorrect in stating that this was not a plan for linear defense. A 1382 *Ming Shi Lu* entry makes clear the location of these 200 passes, all of which are on the line of later walls. (《明太祖实录》148/2338-42.)
- ²³ 《明太祖实录》148/2338-42.
- ²⁴ See 《四镇三关志》ch. 2 (《乘障》).
- ²⁵ 《明太宗实录》68/1303: “塞古北口小关口及大关外门, 仅通一人一马.”
- ²⁶ Waldron, pp. 78, 98.
- ²⁷ 成大林《慎说金界壕不是长城》, 《中国长城博物馆》24 (December 2006), 96: “我们现在不能给长城下一个能概括我国所有长城本质特征的定义... 长城在我们心目中, 仍处于朦胧状态.”
- ²⁸ 罗哲文《访湘西凤凰明长城》, 《光明日报》, February 6 2001, p. B3: “我曾经给长城下过一个定义, 就是它与一般城墙不同之处: 一是其长度在数百里以上, 二是它不封闭, 三是由许多城堡、墩台、关门、敌台、敌楼、城墙等等所组成的防御工程体系.” For more on various competing definitions of a Great Wall, see Hessler, pp. 59-60.
- ²⁹ 《近代名臣边疆要》ch. 5 [vol. 9], 马文升《为议处边机事》: “潮河川外地方活谷被贼十余人杀死翁应山一人... 访得前项达贼累次犯边杀死夜不收, 抢虏人口头畜”; ch. 9 [Vol. 24], 马文升《为遵守祖宗成法以安边方事》: “古北口地方弘治八年二月内被达贼五六十乘夜入境杀虏”; 《明孝宗实录》97/1784: “虏入密云古北口境内, 散掠人畜.” On a 1499 construction project to divert the Chao River just inside Gubei Kou and thereby facilitate its defense, see 诗书[洪峰]《敢与天碰硬的明代潮河川“报废”工程》<http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44769&forumid=1>; <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44770&forumid=1>; <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44772&forumid=1>; <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44866&forumid=1>; <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44867&forumid=1>; <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=44870&forumid=1>; posted April 24-26 2005.
- ³⁰ 《明孝宗实录》102/1868: “请勅大臣一员往潮河相度议作石城... 从之” Regarding the wall having been completed by 1501, see 《明孝宗实录》174 3175: “且今栢楂山, 既以筑墙, 则川乃在墙内” indicating that there had recently been a wall construction project in this area, probably in response to the 1495 raid.
- ³¹ 于谦《少保于公奏议》6/3B, 4A《兵部为来归人马事》: “永平, 山海, 蓟州等处地方... 原设并新增大小关寨一百一十七处, 每关修砌砖墙, 关外又重立阑马石墙...” (Jizhou, 1452); 8/1A-2B《兵部为保举官员事》: “提督官军将关口墙垣打取糙面大石, 插和灰泥, 帮加高厚, 烧办砖瓦” (Baoding, 1450); 陈仁锡《皇明世法录》56/31B: “烧砖修砌边墙” (Liaodong, 1503).
- ³² See, for example, 《明宣宗实录》31/805 “行在工部尚书吴中等奏: 宣府前卫城垣临边, 其东、北六门请以砖砌. 从之.”
- ³³ 郑晓《今言》4/67A, entry 332; 《澹泉笔述》ch. 12: “奏者言: 虏杀我男妇六万, 掳去四万, 掠杂畜数百万, 焚庐舍万区.” On Altan Khan's campaigns in the 1530s and 1540s, see 马楚坚《翁万达为明蒙开太平之追求及其于庚戌之风暴中之效应》, 《明清史集刊》5 (April 2001), 52-54.
- ³⁴ According to *Ming Shi Lu*, this project began in 1551 (“上乃令总督都御史何栋等相度关隘, 亟为修筑” 《明世宗实录》369/6607), though according to He Dong, it actually began in late 1550: “去岁冬初至今春秋半修边千里, 役夫万人, 群居野处” (何栋《太华山人集》3/6B《答都督陆东湖书》, quoted in 特木勒 [Tomor] 《“庚戌之变”与朵颜卫的变迁》, 《蒙古史研究》第七辑 (2003), p. 218. For more on post-1550 wall-building in the Ji-Chang region, see 阿伦 [David Spindler] 《黑峪关外长城修筑时间线索》(五), <http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/phpbbs/index.php?id=76371&forumid=1>, posted January 2 2007; 洪峰《龙泉峪——石佛寺断边成因题解》, 《中国长城博物馆》21 (March 2006), 52; 《四镇三关志》2/25A-又44A.
- ³⁵ There are a variety of sources relating to the Raid of 1554 east of Gubei Kou that mention an earth wall (called “土墙”) in this region. See 项德楨《太师杨襄毅公年谱》2/101A: “游击张承勋奏力言: 土墙瑕且修筑未完, 万分难守,” 项德楨《太师杨襄毅公年谱·杨襄毅公传》6B: “松岭土墙而沙岭土墙、龙王谷至再”; 杨博《杨襄毅公奏疏·蓟辽奏疏》p. 32A《大虏寇边大致克捷疏》: “[杨博]同刘守将未完土墙立限筑打.” For a late 1570s perspective on the earlier wall in this area, see 陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》2/2B《古北城工述》: “梁[梦龙]军门到古北, 次早看司马台新工, 见土心砖石之坚, 甚加称赞; 见所开旧时之墙内皆泛土, 深以为苟且.” I have only been able to find 《蓟门兵事》 in the 1848 edition of 《一斋集》, the only copy of which to my knowledge is held in the National Library of China, call number “t679.”
- ³⁶ 杨博《杨襄毅公奏疏·蓟辽奏疏》p. 40A《大虏寇边大致克捷疏》: “如今, 一定要如[嘉靖]二十九年[1550]的一般进来; 不料, 墙高了, 人马狠了, 又会射箭了, 站着不肯动.”
- ³⁷ See 《明穆宗实录》11/315. While the *Ming Shi Lu* mentions that only the transfer of Tan Lun was approved, both 《明史》(222/5835, 212/5613) and 《明政统宗》(29/24A) state that the transfer of both men was approved. On piracy during the Ming dynasty, see Kwan-wai So, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16th Century* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975).
- ³⁸ 《戚少保年谱》6/37A-37B: “俺答数犯山西, 是秋, 长驱破石州, 而土蛮同时入寇, 蓟州、昌黎几不保. 帝集廷臣议, 以蓟为畿辅重地, 今虏势猖獗, 谁能锁钥北门?”. See also 王天有《试论穆宗大阅与俺答封贡》, 《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》119 (January 1987) 95.

- ³⁹ *Dictionary of Ming Biography*, p. 1244; 《明史》212/5612《戚继光传》. Other military officials originally stationed in the southeast and later brought to the northern border include 王忬 (1507–1560), 汤克宽 (active 1552–1576), 曹邦辅 (1503–1575), and 王崇古 (1515–1589). (For officials involved in organizing the resistance against pirates, see 谷应泰《明史纪事本末》ch. 55《沿海倭乱》).
- ⁴⁰ 胡长春《谭纶抗倭事迹探论》，《江西社会科学》113 (December 1997) 79–81; 《戚少保年谱》chs 1–3; Wu Tingxie, pp. 505–06, 661.
- ⁴¹ 《明史》212/5613《戚继光传》.
- ⁴² 《戚少保年谱》8/1B–2B戚继光《请建空心台疏》;《皇明经世文编》348/1A–2A; 谭纶《谭襄敏公奏议》6/23A–28B《增设重险以保万世治安疏》. A proposal identical to Tan Lun's was also advanced by the Ji Defense Command Grand Coordinator, Liu Yingjie. See 刘应节《白川刘公奏议》2/3A–6B《增设重险以保万世治安疏》.
- ⁴³ “敌台上盖小房三间，使人可藉以避风雨、以储器械、以谨瞭望”《西关志·紫荆志》6/32A 黄洪毗《周边防以御虏患疏》.
- ⁴⁴ 《皇明经世文编》348/1B, 戚继光《建空心台疏》：“[空心敌台]虚中为三层，可驻百夫、器械、粮糈、设备具足。中为疏户以居，上为雉堞，可以用武，虏至即举火，出台上瞰虏方向。”
- ⁴⁵ Many modern scholars claim that Qi Jiguang was the first to build hollow wall towers. See 施元龙主编《中国筑城史》，北京：军事谊文出版社（1999），p. 158; 宗毅《戚继光对军事技术的贡献》，collected in《戚继光研究丛书》编委会《戚继光研究论集》，北京：华文出版社（2001），p. 147; Ray Huang, 1587: *A Year of No Significance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 182. One exception among modern scholars is Jiang Dachun, who correctly points out that both Weng Wanda and Yang Bo had previously proposed building towers, and that Qi's tower-building owes a debt to those that came before him: 蒋大椿《戚继光的军事创造和发明》，《中国史研究》39 (August 1988) 124.
- ⁴⁶ Wen Gui was 90 sui in 1538. See 张璧《阳峰家藏集》25/37B《寿文中丞松斋九十序》.
- ⁴⁷ On Wen Gui's towers, see 刘天和《制府奏议》3/2A《虏众临边往牧不时攻围墩台疏》; see also《明武宗实录》8/251–52. For other pre-Qi Jiguang hollow brick wall towers, see 范景文《师律》14.1/18A《边防》：“嘉靖中于边墙冲口等处，添设空心砖台三百座。山西三关惟偏老沿边地方。自蕨菜茆起至老牛湾止，边长一百一里有奇，添设砖包空心楼，实心楼各十五座”；苏祐《谷原奏议·督抚疏议》(12-chapter ed.)7/43B《陈时弊度虏情始将来大患乞圣明申勅臣工务怀永图责实效以保万世治安疏》：“议添空心敌台三百座，各当沿边冲口鸠工办料。至防秋时，兴工为阻虏患，仅完五分之一。”(Datong, 1554).
- ⁴⁸ This idea was formally proposed by Tan Lun and the Supreme Commander at the time, Liu Yingjie, in the first moon of the third year of the Longqing reign era. See 谭纶《谭襄敏公奏议》6/23A–28A《增设重险以保万世治安疏》；刘应节《白川刘公奏议》2/3A–6B.
- ⁴⁹ “议者遂谓：建台未能阻虏。先伐沿边树木，是台工未睹自撤藩篱，如昔年胡守中故事，非计。[谭]纶乃直陈本末，求罢，请遣大臣阅视台。诚无益，即治臣之罪；如臣谋未左，犹望贵当事诸臣踵而成之。诏：以坚持初议，毋惑人言。”(朱国祯《皇明大事记》34/34B–35A《薊镇边防》；方孔炤《全边略记》1/46B also has a condensed version of this passage). For Zhang Juzheng's reaction to opponents of the tower project, see note 50 below. On Zhao Zhenji's opposition to the tower-building proposal, see 韩霖辑《守围全书》2.2/38A：“诸公修筑之法，谭、戚为胜。当时，议纷纷，即赵文肃[赵贞吉]亦不以为然；盖拘泥常格，流俗通病。”
- ⁵⁰ 张居正《张太岳先生文集》21/27B《答总督谭二华[谭纶]论任事筹边》：“筑台守险可以远哨望、运矢石，势有建瓴之便。…一种幸灾乐祸之人妬人有功，阻人成事，好为异说，以淆乱国是。又幸天下之有事而欲以信其言。闇者不察，从而和之数月纷纷盈耳。仆随事破妄因机解惑，舌几欲微而唇几欲焦矣！”
- ⁵¹ 韩霖辑《守围全书》2.1/42B：“薊镇守边之台，人知[至]今享其利。然当其时，谭二华[谭纶]、戚南塘[戚继光]力主于外；张文忠[张居正]力断于中。庸人众哗，几败”；陈第《一斋集·薊门兵事》2/1A《古北台工述》：“抚院[陈道基]问：从前何故不建台？答曰：从前，无人担当。谭、戚二公造此敌台，费许多口舌，议论乃能成之。岂易易哉！”
- ⁵² Fan Zhongyi mentions the location of the model towers without mentioning how he arrived at this conclusion. See 范中义《戚继光评传》，南宁：广西教育出版社（1996），p. 74. A 1569 entry in Qi Jiguang's biography shows that Qi Jimei built towers to be emulated in Dashui Yu: “看得石塘岭参将陈勋正关河东一号台可与大水谷戚继美为亚配”（《戚少保年谱》8/52A）。According to Qi Zuoguo, Qi Jimei built seven model towers: “是年，台工肇举，人心摇撼，咸怀观望。适，仲叔柳塘公[戚继美]领沂州兵来成，遂奏罢沂戍，留塞上援以台制，戒以忠勤，乃先期而完七台为诸路之倡，人心始定”（《戚少保年谱》8/10B）；according to Tan Lun and Liu Yingjie, Qi Jimei built three model towers: “戚继美春防造完样台三座。…领都司戚继美当台制未定、人心观望之时，首事修建，极其坚精，以为诸路之倡”（谭纶《谭襄敏公奏议》8/8A, 10A《防秋事竣凉功举刺疏》；刘应节《白川刘公奏议》3/22B, 23B《□□□□敌台工完□□□□以励人心疏》）。衣志坚、安忠和《金山岭长城》，海拉尔：内蒙古文化出版社（2001），p. 76 incorrectly state that these model towers were built on the wall at Jinshanling, just west of Simatai.
- ⁵³ See above note citing 谭纶《谭襄敏公奏议》8/8A, 10A《防秋事竣凉功举刺疏》；刘应节《白川刘公奏议》3/22B, 23B《□□□□敌台工完□□□□以励人心疏》；see also Fan Zhongyi, p. 74.
- ⁵⁴ 《戚少保年谱》8/2B, 戚继光《请建空心敌台疏》；see also 汪道昆《太函集》87/2A《颍兵额饷议》. According to another account, the number of towers was scaled down to 1600 by the Ministry of War: “纶奏

- 筑台之役。[兵]部以简墩省费，必不能从。三千之名改为一千六百座，而流言传播。臣愿请罢斥。上曰：论其坚持，毋惑人言”；（《全边略记》1/46B）； other sources say 1500 towers（杨博《杨襄毅公本兵疏议》21/31B《覆劄辽总督侍郎刘应节等敌台完工赏疏》；项德楨《太师杨襄毅公年谱》9/96A）。
- 55 谭纶《谭襄毅公奏议》8/1B《防秋事竣谅功举刺疏》；刘应节《白川刘公奏议》3/16B《口口口口敌台完工口口口口以励人心疏》。
- 56 项德楨《太师杨襄毅公年谱》9/97A：“帝曰敌台完工...”。
- 57 On ongoing wall-building during this period, see 《戚少保年谱》8/15B, 15B-16A “彼[石塘、古北、墙子]三路墙城已完，关营俱竣...若松、太、燕、台、石五区边墙未有者十尚二三，灰水粉饰，一截可颓者，连数百里皆然。筑台则墙工必废，修墙则不能筑台，实为两难。即台工始约以三年，未必能毕，则边墙、偏坡又当坍塌过半。”（1569）。Regarding wall construction methods while the tower-building project was going on, see 《戚少保年谱》7/24A：“其边墙亦因吴抚院[吴嘉会]所筑为式；薄者加厚，低者增高。” On the continuity of the wall construction methods used in the pre-1576 period, see 《四镇三关志》7/252A：“至隆庆初年始有建台之议...当时，墙犹夫旧也。至我皇上御极四年，始有拆旧墙、修新墙之议。新墙高广加于旧墙，皆以三合土筑心，表里砖包，表里垛口，纯用灰浆，足与边腹砖城比坚並久。”《戚少保年谱》11/36B also has a very similar version of this passage. The Wu Jiahui standard wall in the Ji-Chang area in the 1550s was a field-stone and mortar wall.
- 58 “巡按直隶御史万民英巡视蓟镇，还奏：墙子岭、白马关一带边墙为前任巡抚吴嘉会所筑，苟苟且倖成，冒破公帑，故旋筑旋圯，虏得乘之而入。乞遣官按视工所，严核钱粮，虚出之数如法论治。疏上，诏锦衣卫先逮嘉会下狱”（《明世宗实录》457/7731）；“先年，巡抚吴嘉会修边事理，既用官帑，又派民夫，则沿边郡县为之骚然”（谭纶《谭襄毅公奏议》6/26A《增设重险以保万世治安疏》）；刘应节《白川刘公奏议》2/5A）。
- 59 On Tan Lun and Liu Yingjie's explicit reference to Liu Tao's "building through non-building," see “先年，修边所费钜万。后，总督侍郎刘焘因见前巡抚都御史吴嘉会以修边被谤，遂创‘为不修之修’之说；将边工尽派主客官军，且修且守，而所省亦钜万。”（*ibid.*, p. 25B/p. 5A）。
- 60 Bai Cuiqin, pp. 23-24; Cao Yongnian, pp. 77-84.
- 61 Johan Elverskog notes that the Dayan Khan successfully reaffirmed the idea that there was an unbroken Chinggisid lineage from the time of Chinggis Khan to his era. Johan Elverskog, *The Jewel Translucent Sutra: Altan Khan and the Mongols in the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 9-10. This concept is helpful in explaining why Eastern Mongol leaders of the mid-sixteenth century found it sufficient to trace their lineage only as far back as the Dayan Khan, via the first son in every generation.
- 62 Perhaps the only exception to this was the Dayan Khan, though the authenticity of his bloodline has been called into question by modern scholars. (Christopher Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (Facts on File: New York, 2004), p. 138.)
- 63 Waldron, p. 36 (distilled from writings on the causes of nomadic raiding): “[Raiding is] an activity which facilitates the formation of supra-tribal confederations, one tool an ambitious leader can use to reward his followers, and ensure their loyalty;” p. 81: “Nomads generally strengthened political cohesion by distributing wealth captured from sedentary peoples;” p. 93: “[The Mongols,] needing resources with which to wage their inter-necine struggles, they began to draw nearer to the Chinese border.” Su You (1492-1571), an expert on northern border policy, observed, “我中国货物，虏所甚利。抢掠，则利散诸部落；求贡，则利归于酋首。其贪利者，又其一也。虏中小王子者，俺答之姪也。俺答筑弩，钤制漠北，诸部落渐不听小王子约束，然亦一部落之雄耳。而犹有其姪压于其上，乃阴慕东夷朵颜等卫归顺内附，官爵之显荣，衣服之华丽，意望我皇上比例加授于焉。夸耀于诸部落中而欲与小王子争雄长。此慕名者，又其一也。”（苏祐《谷原奏议》（4-chapter ed.）3/9A-9B《接报夷情疏》；《皇明经世文编》216/7B；also quoted in Nagayai Takami, 《关于阿勒坦的汗号》，《蒙古学信息》78 (March 2000) 4. Gu Yingtai suggests that the poor quality of Altan Khan's grasslands compared to those of other powerful Mongols was a reason for his raiding: “[Altan Khan's older brother] 吉囊分地河套，当关中，地肥沃。俺答分开原、上都，最贫，以故最喜为寇。”（《明史纪事本末》60/911 (中华书局 edition), cited in Wang Tianyou, p. 93.) “今者，俺答必欲求贡，意欲依附天王，借取声光，以自壮门面”（《皇明经世文编》166/10A，史道《题北虏求贡疏》）。
- 64 “俺答纵所虏湖巢马房内官杨增持番书入城求贡”（《明世宗实录》364/6494）。
- 65 “[翁万达]条上《安边疏》，大略谓虏贪。寇，则利部落；贡，则利酋长”（王锡爵《王文肃公文集》6/14B-15A《翁襄毅公神道碑》）；“虏之入寇也，人得肆掠，利则归于部落。虏之纳款也，赏独专给，利归于酋长”（王崇古《少保鉴川王公督府奏议》8/28A《为虏王修贡乞恩酌议贡市未妥事宜慰华夷以永安攘事》）；see also Su You's quote in note 63 above.
- 66 For the dates of Dayan Khan's life, see Atwood, p. 138; for the year of Cürüke's death, see Henry Serruys, *Tables of the Descendants of the Dayan Qan* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1958), p. 94; for the dates of Darayisun's life, see *ibid.*, p. 21.
- 67 Tomor 《“庚戌之变”与朵颜卫的变迁》，p. 211.
- 68 For the birth and death dates of Old Batur, see Serruys *Tables*, p. 120; Sengge's birth and death dates are from Elverskog, p. 97.
- 69 奥登《关于阿勒坦汗历史作用评价的问题》；this article appears in 《蒙古史文集》，呼和浩特：内蒙古教育出版社（1992）和《土默特史料》16（1985）；his argument appears on pp. 145-46 and 114-15 respectively. For Tümen's birth and death dates, see Serruys

Tables, p. 24; for a confirmation of the year in the twelve-year cycle that Tümen was born, see 陶望齡《歇菴集》16/17B《兵部尚書環洲吳[免]公行狀》：“帳中具知土蠻亥生人，避岁不為寇。”(1539 was a 己亥 year).

⁷⁰ “俺蒼于諸虜為尊行，力能合之、必同心內附，然後可假以王封、官諸酋長，比三衛，示羈縻也。”(瞿汝說輯《皇明臣略纂聞》4/21B-22A).

⁷¹ 翁万达《稽愆集》p. 22A-22B《奉徐少湖宗伯》：“聞俺答不孩近与小王子搆隙。果尔，则中国之利也。”

⁷² 譚其驥主编《中国历史地图集》vol. 7, p. 82. Borjigidai Oyunbilig points out that these were not the names used by the Three Commanderies themselves. Collectively, they referred to themselves as 山阳万户, 乌济业特兀魯思, or 山阳六千乌济业特. The Duoyan Commandery referred to themselves as 兀良哈, the Taining Commandery as 翁牛特 or 往流, and the Fuyu Commandery as 乌济业特. (乌云毕力格[Borjigidai Oyunbilig]《关于朵颜兀良哈人的若干问题》,《蒙古史研究》第七辑(2003), pp. 221-22.

⁷³ Cao Yongnian, p. 82; 贾敬颜《明成祖割地兀良哈考辨》,《蒙古史研究》第一辑(1985), p. 26;《明太祖实录》196/2946:“置泰宁、朵颜、福余三卫指挥使司于兀良哈之地,以居降胡。”

⁷⁴ “[朵颜三卫]与小王子缔姻”(1514,《明武宗实录》116/2357, cited in Oyunbilig《关于朵颜兀良哈人的若干问题》, p. 227);“给事中陈时明言:朵颜花当之子把儿孙顷与北虜小王子连婚”(1522,《明世宗实录》38/952). Note that these and other marriage alliances mentioned in this article took place between parties of greatly differing power and status and probably as a result the husbands of princesses were not accorded the title *tabunang*, which during the Ming dynasty was often used by husbands of princesses directly descended from Yuan dynasty emperors. For more on the use of this title during the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, see 贾敬颜《五投下的遗民—兼说“塔布囊”一词》,《民族研究》34 (March 1985), 29-36.

⁷⁵ Tomor《“庚戌之变”与朵颜卫的变迁》, p. 211; Oyunbilig《关于朵颜兀良哈人的若干问题》, pp. 228-30.

⁷⁶ Tomor《“庚戌之变”与朵颜卫的变迁》, pp. 213, 220.

⁷⁷ Oyunbilig《关于朵颜兀良哈人的若干问题》, pp. 231-32.

⁷⁸ On the attack, see《万历武功录》ch. 8《黄台吉列传》p. 1A:“制置使何栋...是时,胡中名黄台吉为辛爱,日引安滩、把都儿、克失炭等略伯彦帖忽思。”He Dong served as a Supreme Commander from early 1551 to early 1554 (Wu Tingxie, pp. 1-2). On Bayan Tegüs' position at the time (都指挥金事), see《明世宗实录》246/4944. On the location of Bayan Tegüs' camp at the time, see 王忬《御史大夫思质王公奏议》(10-chapter ed.) 9/15A《哨探紧急虏情疏》:“据古北口参将杨照差尖哨桂寄儿报称,役哨到地名无碍,离边三百余里,入帖忽思营内...”

⁷⁹ See a memorial from the third moon of the thirty-fourth year of the Jiajing reign:“虜...收把总伯言帖忽思诸部,则撤我古北之藩篱”(杨博《太师杨襄毅公本兵

奏疏》(12-chapter ed.)1/6A-6B《开陈防守蓟镇事宜责成边臣疏》).

⁸⁰ 1398: 南炳文、汤刚《明史》,上海:上海人民出版社(2003), p. 127; 1449: “[1444]三卫乃並入寇。命成国公朱勇率诸军分道出喜峰口诸处...遇福余贼,战败之。次虎头山及流沙。遇泰宁、朵颜,又败之...自是三卫寝宴,然怨我刺骨,因通也先导之入寇矣”(《荒徼通考·朵颜三卫》); 1550: “都御史汪汝孝愤三卫之索无厌也,尝出境朴杀之。诸夷以此蓄怨...然遂通北虜,潢古北矣”(方孔炤《全边略记》1/21B), but 见 何栋《太华山人集》3/6B《答都督陆东湖书》:“今,边警稍缓,但朵颜逆夷深为可恶,固当征剿,以正国法。但勾引之情皆出传闻,又系逆芹推祸之言。”; 1563: “虜入墙子岭,初,杨选质通罕父子。三卫夷皆怨,益与虜通,遂勾虜入寇。”(谈迁《国榷》ch. 64).

⁸¹ 胡宗宪《三巡奏议》1/35B, 35B-36A《为献愚忠以裨国计疏》:“若蓟州,则隔绝朵颜,且承平日久,间谍不设。惟倚熟夷陈通事辈为之传言...谚所谓因魔问疾,真此谓也。故臣常谓:大同之哨,探得其情;宣府之哨,探得其形;若蓟州则并其形亦不得矣!此亦势之必然者也。”

⁸² On the Eastern Mongol practice of planning large raids several months in advance, see 萧大亨《夷俗记·战阵》pp. 25A-26B.

⁸³ “打来孙、把都儿七个大头儿领着达子十万,自七月里商量到如今,一定要如[嘉靖]二十九年的[referring to the Raid of 1550]一般进来”(杨博《杨襄毅公奏疏·蓟辽奏疏》p. 40A《大虜寇边大致克捷疏》).

⁸⁴ On how the Mongols disguised their intentions as to where they were going to raid, see 萧大亨《夷俗记·战阵》p. 26A.

⁸⁵ 《明名臣言行录》(95-chapter ed.) 65/4B《尚书杨襄毅公博》:“鹵窥蓟。谍卒于一月前得其情,知将窺墙子岭,故厚集兵马以拒之。三卫彝为鹵导者,侦其难入,则给总督杨选质鹵欲由潘家口进。选信之,乃引精锐往赴。”

⁸⁶ 杨博《杨襄毅公奏疏·蓟辽奏疏》p. 32A《大虜寇边大致克捷疏》:“哨到夷人哈哈赤营,说称西虜把都儿等已与东虜打来孙等会合,在地名白庙儿聚兵。众头儿约在本月二十七,八日决由古北口进抢。”

⁸⁷ “咸宁侯仇鸾言:朵颜诸夷影克、哈哈赤、哈舟儿、陈通事等昨岁导虜犯顺 [referring to the Raid of 1550]”《明世宗实录》376/6696).

⁸⁸ On the Ming diplomatic recognition of Altan Khan and the resumption of the horse markets, see Wang Tianyou, pp. 95-99; 高树林《明朝隆庆年间与蒙古右翼的封贡互市》,《河北大学学报》23 (March 1982), 141-46.

⁸⁹ Ma Chujian calculates that between 1522 and 1544, the Mongols raided the Chinese border 105 times. Of these attacks, Altan Khan's caused the most damage. (Ma Chujian, p. 52).

⁹⁰ On the relatively quiet Ji-Chang border before 1576, see Robert Thompson, “Defense of the Northern Frontier in Ming China Especially the Chi-chou Area Northeast of Peking 1569-83,” Master's thesis, University of Chicago, 1962, pp. 42-43.

⁹¹ On the pre-Raid of 1550 territory of the Xuan-Da Supreme Commander, see 胡宗宪《三巡奏议》1/43A

- 《为黠虏近边甘言求贡乞勅文武大臣从长酌议以定大计疏》：“宣大重镇，京师北门，总督之任亦难其代然...此官兼总四镇。” In addition to the post-1550 regions of Xuanfu, Datong, and Shanxi, the fourth *zhen* presumably refers to Baoding.
- ⁹² Tomor points out that expenditures in the Ji Defense Command in 1582 were over eleven times the level of expenditures before 1550. Tomor 《“庚戌之变”与朵颜卫的变迁》，p. 217.
- ⁹³ 汪少泉辑《皇明奏疏类钞》43/42B，杨博《钦奉圣谕条陈边计疏》：“如蓟州、昌平、保定三镇，有墙可恃。虏难保其不来，但当乘高据险，使之匹马不入，即为上策。山西、宣、大、辽东四镇无墙可恃，虏难保其不入，但当坚壁清野，使之一毫不得，即为中策。”
- ⁹⁴ 刘曰梧《蓟门摘藁》1/29B《为黠虏乘夜犯边官军追斩多级酌叙有功官员以昭激劝事》：“蓟门以匹马不入为功。”(1616)
- ⁹⁵ On this raid, see 《明史》327/8485.
- ⁹⁶ This raid occurred in what is now Eastern Hebei Province, ending in disaster for the Mongols when their troops plunged off a cliff, lemming-like, as they were en route back into Mongolian territory. The most detailed account of this raid is in 《万历武功录》ch. 10《土蛮列传上》pp. 2B-4A.
- ⁹⁷ Regarding this raid, see 《万历武功录》ch. 13《董狐狸兀鲁思罕长秃列传》pp. 12B-13A, 24B-25A, 《长昂列传》pp. 29A-29B.
- ⁹⁸ On the location of Sengge's base, see Serruys *Tables*, p. 85; on the logic of his close relations with the Three Commanderies, see *ibid.*, p. 86.
- ⁹⁹ Ao Deng points out that Altan Khan married one of his daughters to the son of Menggudai (猛古歹) and that Sengge married one of his daughters to a “Shao Chaoman” (少炒蛮). (奥登《东西土默特关系述略》，p. 175, in 《土默特史料》20集, 1986). On marital alliances between the Tumend and Duoyan Mongols, see also 特木勒 [Tomor] 《十六世纪后半叶的朵颜卫》，《内蒙古大学学报(人文社会科学版)》36.3 (May 2004), p. 53 and 乌云毕力格 [Borjigidai Oyunbilig] 《论东土默特蒙古》，p. 207, in 《蒙古史研究》第八辑 (2005). On Sengge's other wives and their origins, see Serruys *Tables*, pp. 86-87.
- ¹⁰⁰ “东西二虏得肋服之[指朵颜三卫]，事以子女，不得已也。其种最贵者为之婚，虏酋岁至祭天以往来其部落，而次则奉女为嬖只...” 郭造卿《卢龙塞略》15/21A. I have consulted Buyanhoo (薄音湖) and Wang Xiong's 《明代蒙古汉籍史料汇编》第二辑，内蒙古大学出版社：呼和浩特 (2000) in punctuating this and other quotations from *Lulong Sailue*.
- ¹⁰¹ 《明世宗实录》521/8527.
- ¹⁰² For a biography of Sengge's wife 大嬖只 (Mongolian *beyiji*, following Serruys *Tables*, p. 86), see 《万历武功录》ch. 13《大嬖只传》11A-12B. *Ming Shilu* does not mention the Great *Beyiji* until 1576, thus I have left the upper bound of her active dates as a question mark.
- ¹⁰³ Serruys, “Two Remarkable Women in Mongolia: The Third Lady Erketü Qatun and Dayicing-Beyiji,” *Asia Major* 19.2 (1974-1975), 194; “Four Documents Relating to the Sino-Mongol Peace of 1570-1571,” *Monumenta Serica*, 19.1 (1960), 5. The Ming scholar Wang Shiqi also calls a 比妓 a wife of a prince, or princess: “比妓，是各台吉之妻，与宗室妃同。”(王士琦《三云筹俎考》2/24A).
- ¹⁰⁴ “嬖只者，妾之称也”(《卢龙塞略》15/21A); “各酋首之妾，虏中皆呼为嬖只”(《皇明世法录》57/33B, 米万春《蓟门考》).
- ¹⁰⁵ 《皇明世法录》57/33B: “前各酋首之妾，虏中皆呼为嬖只。各夷借势为名，阳虽中华藩篱，阴实北虏乡导，故抚赏不可不厚。”
- ¹⁰⁶ 《蒙古源流》，ch. 5, cited in Wada Sei, 《东亚史研究·蒙古篇》. *Môko hen* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1959), p. 581.
- ¹⁰⁷ The Great *Beyiji*, the Lesser *Beyiji*, and a Baotu (宝兔) *Beyiji* were all daughters of Duoyan chieftains and wives of Sengge. See 《卢龙塞略》15/21B.
- ¹⁰⁸ For the lineage of the Great and Lesser *Beyiji*, see 《卢龙塞略》ch. 15. For the year of Qotong's death, see 《近代名臣边疆提要》ch. 12 [vol. 33], 周禔《为边防事》：“花当之死，今已四年”(memorial written 嘉靖十年五月二十日); see also 特木勒 [Tomor] 《朵颜卫研究—以十六世纪为中心》，PhD dissertation, Nanjing University, 2001, p. 10; cited in Oyunbilig 《关于朵颜兀良哈人的若干问题》，p. 225.
- ¹⁰⁹ “伯彦帖忽思妻名八个镇，伊女是辛爰之妾。”(《皇明世法录》57/31B). Note that this text renders Bahazhen as 八个镇.
- ¹¹⁰ “伯彦帖忽思，三妻，子五。嫡挨只伦，子二，长曰撒因帖忽思...次曰炒蛮都指挥金事...[伯彦帖忽思]原收姨母把哈真，生子三。”《卢龙塞略》15/6A.
- ¹¹¹ 《卢龙塞略》15/6A. Ayatai's base was also near 无碍, which shows that this was in fact another name for the Great *Beyiji*'s brother Aitaibi: “伯彦打来、阿牙台等巢俱住正西忽石哈、无碍，去边六百余里”《威少保年谱》9/48B; 《皇明世法录》58/6A.
- ¹¹² “挨台必霍炒蛮云：‘[古北]口里兵马甚多，早间我亲见聚集一处。不走，恐复出来拿我嬖只！’蛮炒即收帐房，望北遁走。”(陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》2/12B《古北事宜揭》)
- ¹¹³ “看得苏妹阿卜亥乃大嬖只之女，炒蛮之姨也。”(陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》2/11A《古北事宜揭》)
- ¹¹⁴ “小炒蛮” is the rendering given in 《三镇边务总要》vol. 3/36A and 《四镇三关志》6/89A. 《卢龙塞略》15/21B lists a Chaoman who had an older sister who was Sengge's Great *Beyiji* (15/21B), a “Younger Chaoman” (少炒蛮) who was a son-in-law of Sengge (15/22A), a Duoyan Chaoman who was the first son of 哈哈赤(15/13B), and a Chaoman who was the second son of Bayan Tegüs (15/6A). The first, second, and fourth Chaoman were one in the same person; the third Chaoman was Chaoman the Elder. 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮列传》p. 12B identifies the Chaoman involved in this raid as the second son of Bayan Tegüs. 《明通鉴》renders Chaoman as 绰哈 (66/25A); 《皇明臣略纂闻》as 操蛮 (2/70B); 《明神宗实录》as 草蛮 (138/2576).

¹¹⁵ On Chaoman the Elder's genealogy, see 《卢龙塞略》 15/13B. 《明代蒙古汉籍史料汇编》 Vol. 2 (punctuated by 于默颀, 呼和浩特: 内蒙古大学出版社 (2000), p. 563; Tomor, 《十六世纪后半叶的朵颜卫》 p. 3 (2004), 53, and Wada Sei 1959, p. 581 all mispunctuate a passage from 《皇明世法录》 57/32A–32B 米万春《蓟门考》, giving the reader the mistaken impression that the oldest son of Hahachi is known as “大炒蛮.” Yu Moying mispunctuates the sentence as “今哈哈等早故, 止遗弟一人虎头罕哮嘍. 大炒蛮...” not realizing that the text is corrupted: the “一” should be “二,” and that 虎头罕 and 哮嘍大 are two different people, both younger brothers of Hahachi (《四镇三关志》 10/8A is correct in stating “第二人”). In the case of Tomor, he accidentally omits the first two characters in the three-character name of Chaoman's uncle 哮嘍大, then mistakenly punctuates the “大” as being part of Chaoman's name: “第一人虎头罕, 大炒蛮...” Wada Sei starts a quotation as “大炒蛮见有亲兄弟...” 《四镇三关志》, while written earlier than 《蓟门考》, may have used a source in common with it. Page 10/8A uses the character “又” to separate the name of Boluoda and his nephew Chaoman, but mistakenly places the character before the “大”: “曰字罗又大炒蛮...”

¹¹⁶ 《戚少保年谱》 9/47B, 《皇明世法录》 58/4A.

¹¹⁷ Curiously, I am unable to find sources listing his pastures here or elsewhere, only references that he received his *fushang* in the Gubei Kou area. (《四镇三关志》 6/89A) For Bayan Tegüs' home base, see 杨博《本兵疏议》 (24-chapter ed.) 7/8B 《遵谕申飭蓟镇宣大等处守御疏》; 《卢龙塞略》 15/6B.

¹¹⁸ See also note 114 above.

¹¹⁹ Tomor 《十六世纪后半叶的朵颜卫》, p. 53 points out that marriage alliances between the Eastern Mongols and Uriangha Mongols usually happened after the former brought the latter under their control. By the mid-1550s, Sengge was already in his early thirties, making it unlikely that the Great *Beyiji* was his first wife.

¹²⁰ 《四镇三关志》 10/9B (published 1578) lists her base as 无碍, 350 *li* from the border, near the camp of an Aitaibi 挨台必. 《皇明世法录》 57/31B 《蓟门考》 (probably reflecting information that Mi Wanchun collected while serving as a Mobile Corps Commander (游击将军) in the Chang Defense Command around 1584 — see 《明神宗实录》 154/2849) lists her as living in Aitaibi's camp itself: “[大嬖只]今古北哨役, 入属夷挨台必营是也。” 《皇明世法录》 58/9A 戚继光《蓟镇边防》 lists her camp as being over 100 *li* from Aitaibi's camp: “挨台必巢住白塔川, 去边二百余里. 大比只巢住无碍, 去边三百五十里。” Wada Sei, p. 581 states that Aitaibi is 阿牙他皮, (presumably the Chahkar Mongol listed in 《卢龙塞略》 15/14A as the suzerain of the descendants of Hahachi, including Chaoman the Elder). Serruys *Tables*, p. 29, on the other hand, identifies this Ayataibi as a son of Emil and a cousin of Darayisun. Wada

Sei's assertion is clearly wrong, because it would be illogical for the Great *Beyiji* to abandon her own biological family whose suzerain was the Tumed Mongol Sengge and seek the protection of the Chahkar Mongol Ayatabi.

¹²¹ 翟九思《万历武功录》 ch. 8 《黄台吉传》 pp. 13B–14A: “初, 黄台吉贪鄙宣淫, 常夺诸夷妇二十余口, 后至以百数. 久之, 以不能养赡, 故往往纵其走各边, 需索衣食费, 以致外奔, 胡中口语殊藉藉.”; 申时行《纶扉阁牍》 3/67A 《苔张岷岷[张佳胤]总督》: “黄台吉妻妾百数, 其子多弃不收”; 王崇古《少保鉴川王公督府奏议》 10/4A 《为传报虏情严防范酌抚剿以伐虏谋事》: “查得虏酋黄台吉素性兇狠, 贪鄙宣淫, 真同禽兽, 虚诈无耻, 独异诸酋, 占收各枝夷妇二十余口, 不能养赡, 纵其沿边索讨衣食, 月无宁日” (1573). Oyunbilig (《论东土默特蒙古》, p. 207, states that Sengge divorced his Duoyan Mongol wives in order to marry his father's powerful widow the Third Lady (1551–1612, Chinese 三娘子). He does not state his source, but it is likely 《万历武功录》 ch. 9 《三娘子传》 p. 10B: “始, 黄台吉所夺诸酋妇至多, 及一朝得三娘子而尽弃之, 此不可谓能乎!” Serruys *Two Remarkable Women*, p. 207 cites the same passage to support his statement that the Third Lady compelled Sengge to divorce his other wives. For the birth and death dates of the Third Lady, see Elverskog, p. 114.

¹²² 《万历武功录》 ch. 8 《黄台吉列传》 p. 17B.

¹²³ 陶望龄《歇菴集》 16/15B 《兵部尚书环洲吴[兑]公行状》; 《皇明臣略纂闻》 4/26B. “初, 黄台吉娶妇, 生扯力良, 无宠; 又妻大成台吉之母, 生五路台吉, 色衰, 复弃之, 尽夺其所部万骑与他庶孽.”

¹²⁴ “乞庆哈沉酒色, 旦莫呻吟于床褥之间” 《万历武功录》 ch. 8 《黄台吉列传》 p. 17B.

¹²⁵ “猛可真系西虏老把都儿之弃妾, 是以狐假虎威, 益无忌惮. 往年窃犯黑谷关...” 王一鸢《总督四镇奏议》 4/62A 《贼夷境外窃掠查参将领疏》.

¹²⁶ 王一鸢《总督四镇奏议》 5/41B 《议增辽镇军饷马价疏》: “三卫属夷为我藩篱, 北虏隔在绝漠.”

¹²⁷ 李如樟《三镇边务总要》 vol. 3/6A: “抚赏帑银三千六十九两五钱一分七厘; 内除每年差哨送哨报信坐门流赏等项, 约用银二百七两二钱九分, 实该抚夷赏银二千八百六十二两二钱二分七厘.”

¹²⁸ (《明世宗实录》 140/3266: “禁抚赏以杜窥伺... 其沿边诸关道路勿令虏得往来窥视虚实”). For *fushang* amounts and locations in the Ji Defense Command, see 《三镇边务总要》 vol. 3.

¹²⁹ 《[万历]大明会典》 130/3A.

¹³⁰ For an early reference to the granting of *fushang*, see 《明世宗实录》 130/3083–3084.

¹³¹ 王一鸢《总督四镇奏议》 5/33B [page with memorial title is missing]: “抚赏不独以联狡夷之心, 且因以省守支之费也.”

¹³² 《明世宗实录》 370/6614: “宜加抚处, 令其摠摠图报, 御虏有功者, 许奏请升赏.”

¹³³ 《明世宗实录》 399/7002 “朵颜诸夷挟以恐喝中国, 不时索赏... 诸夷益骄肆, 逻卒出塞, 輒捕而束缚之, 叩关取贖. 诸将校苟幸无事. 每敛军资贖之去. 其有不得贖, 辄杀. 所执卒恬无顾忌.”

- ¹³⁴ 《万历武功录》ch. 8《俺答列传下》p. 37B: “如三卫抚赏不足, 则削月粮。月粮不足, 则令军士买柴以充赏。”
- ¹³⁵ 《皇明经世文编》317/25A-25B, 王崇古《为遵奉明旨经画北虏封贡未妥事宜疏》“查得蓟镇三卫之抚赏, 每岁银一万三千余两。而该镇扣军粮, 权采办以佐之, 尚不下二万余两。”
- ¹³⁶ 陈仁锡《皇明世法录》56/50B: “抚赏止喜峰口一路, 所与不过米盐。今所在有不时之扰, 益以牛羊筴币。岁用银万四千两有奇, 关将无所措, 则取之军。军贫不胜求辄亡去。”
- ¹³⁷ Tomor《十六世纪后半叶的朵颜卫》, p. 54.
- ¹³⁸ 陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》1/17B《稟戚总理揭(2)》: “嬖只...遣通事求讨黄台吉之赏。”
- ¹³⁹ The first indication I can find that the Chinese knew that the Great *Beyiji* had been scorned by Sengge is in her biography in chapter 13, 《大嬖只炒蛮列传》p. 11A of the *Wanli Wugong Lu*, which was published in 1612 (Franke, *Sources of Ming History*, p. 63). On Chaoman's use of his sister's status to extort *fushang*, see 《皇明臣略纂闻》2/70B and 《歇菴集》16/18A《兵部尚书环洲吴[兑]公行状》: “朵颜操蛮以其姊妻黄台吉, 挟赏、寇边...”
- ¹⁴⁰ For late-Ming sources that indicated that Sengge and the Great *Beyiji* were still married, see 《皇明臣略纂闻》2/70B (Chongzhen era) and 《歇菴集》16/18A《兵部尚书环洲吴[兑]公行状》(late Wanli era): “朵颜操蛮, 以其姊妻黄台吉, 挟赏、寇边、攻毁鸦鹤寨、杀二将军。” Zhang Juzheng indicates that Wu Dui informed him that Chaoman and the Great *Beyiji* were married: “领悉炒蛮者, 与西虏嬖只为婚...”(《张太岳先生文集》28/21A《答督府吴环洲[兑]》). Though published later, *Ming Shi* also reflects the Chinese belief that Chaoman and the Great *Beyiji* were married at the time: 戚继光《明史》212/5616 “久之, 炒蛮偕妻大嬖只袭掠边卒, 官军追破之。”
- ¹⁴¹ “朵颜操蛮, 以其姊妻黄台吉, 挟赏, 寇边、攻毁鸦鹤寨、杀二将军”(《皇明臣略纂闻》2/70B).
- ¹⁴² “有尖哨毕元进口, 高胜先密访之。毕元乃言为张廷福因走失官马投降大嬖只, 教之加倍取赏。如本路不从, 即借黄台吉兵马愿为响导入寇等语”(陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》2/20B《稟陈[道基]抚院揭》)。
- ¹⁴³ “前各酋首之妾, 虏中皆呼为嬖只。各夷借势为名, 阳虽中华藩篱, 阴实北虏乡导, 故抚赏不可不厚。”《皇明世法录》57/33B.
- ¹⁴⁴ 陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》1/25A-25B《上俞后府书》: “抚赏耳, 未曾亲身经历。今亲身经历, 殆有悲愤不忍言者。通袖、金段、布帛、什物堆积如山; 牛羊米面不计其数。即嬖只三百余骑到关, 日食四五十金, 言语狂妄, 无所忌讳, 且需索无厌。应赏布者, 则求金段。应赏金段者, 则求通袖。应桌席一百者, 则求增二三百, 其积习然也。将领骫骳皆曲意从之。”
- ¹⁴⁵ For Ayatai's rank, see 《卢龙塞略》15/6A. For listings of titles granted to Three Commanderies Mongols, see generally, 《卢龙塞略》ch. 15.
- ¹⁴⁶ See 《四镇三关志》6/89A, which lists Gubei Kou as the place where Chaoman collected his *fushang*.
- ¹⁴⁷ He probably married Sengge's daughter not long after the Tumed-Duoyan alliance was formed in the 1550s. The Great *Beyiji* was probably well aware of the effect that irking Sengge's kin could have on the Chinese, as seen from the Tonghan incident and the Raid of 1563, described above.
- ¹⁴⁸ 《明世宗实录》494/8202. Since Chaoman is mentioned together with Ayatai (here rendered 阿牙塔), I conclude that this refers to Chaoman the Younger and his half-brother.
- ¹⁴⁹ See 《四镇三关志》6/89A, which lists Gubei Kou as the place where Chaoman collected his *fushang*.
- ¹⁵⁰ Dating of the raid from 《卢龙塞略》11/22B. For evidence that this raid was in retaliation for Chinese refusal of additional *fushang*, see (《明神宗实录》51/1190: “蓟镇属夷炒蛮挟赏不遂, 潜犯古北口”). For the number of raiders, see 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》p. 13B. According to Guo Zaoqing, the Great *Beyiji* herself took part in this raid: “炒蛮、嬖只, 六七十人乘雨攀墙潜入古北口鸦鹤庵寨杀掠”(《卢龙塞略》11/22B) Other sources do not list her as personally participating in the raid. On the woodcutters' path, see 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮列传》p. 13B; 方孔炤《全边略记》1/49B. Guo Zaoqing said that the raiders did climb a wall to get in: “炒蛮、嬖只, 六七十人乘雨攀墙潜入古北口鸦鹤庵寨杀掠”(《卢龙塞略》11/22B) and Qu Jiushi writes that there was a wall in Falcon Gap at the time: “鸦鹤山...绝顶一口, 阔可八丈, 我以女墙堵之”(《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》p. 13A). The modern scholar Fan Zhongyi claims, without indicating supporting evidence, that the raiders did not breach the wall in this raid. Fan Zhongyi, p. 96: “敌人始终没有越过边墙。”
- ¹⁵¹ Author's visits to this section in March and July, 2006.
- ¹⁵² 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》p. 13B.
- ¹⁵³ The account of the raid is from 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》pp. 13B-14A.
- ¹⁵⁴ 陈第《一斋集·蓟门兵事》1/20A《分别通事善恶稟帖》: “又炒蛮部下有李通事者, 儉诈狼戾, 为炒蛮谋主。凡炒蛮百计需索, 皆渠教之。先年, 导抢鸦鹤寨俱有实迹。” On the people that the Chinese suspected as guiding for Altan Khan in 1550, see 《明世宗实录》379/6723 and 《荒微通考·朵颜三卫》。
- ¹⁵⁵ 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》p. 14A.
- ¹⁵⁶ See 《明神宗实录校堪记》56/385 “先是, 鸦鹤菴之犯, 盖夷妇嬖只及炒蛮不能制其部夷索赏作逆, 寻惧兵, 窜独石。该镇官宣谕祸福, 于是缚献罪首阿都赤等一十七名, 送还原虏人畜。总督杨兆等以闻。兵部请献俘正法, 因言: 罪人既得, 国法已申, 应有各夷罪, 诏免嬖只、炒蛮罪, 复贡赏。”
- ¹⁵⁷ 《万历武功录》ch. 13《炒蛮传》p. 15A.
- ¹⁵⁸ 《卢龙塞略》11/23A-23B: “...且声讨剿夷灭咎炒蛮。宣府抚院以其[炒蛮]姊为北虏大嬖只, 恐失北虏心, 曲为宣谕。”
- ¹⁵⁹ “时有影克兄弟八支, 约二千余骑, 在会州、青城等处住牧, 长昂, 炒蛮, 董狐狸诸夷及夷妇大、小嬖只, 猛可真等号为六凶” 顾炎武《昌平山水记》2/19A.

- ¹⁶⁰ On the Great *Beyiji*'s raids in the 1580s and the Chinese continuing to provide her with *fushang* after these raids, see 《明神宗实录》138/2576 “薊镇督抚周咏等题：本年六月夷妇大嬖只部落达子约六百余骑在古北口边外抢去出关牧放马一百七十一匹，杀尖夜家丁一十一名，抢去军人一十七名；官军並無追赶对阵...先年与草蛮部落诱杀参将苑宗儒，朝廷赦其旧恶、姑准照常通貢”；《明神宗实录》144/2680 “夷妇大嬖只本年六月入犯古北口，闭关停赏。后将原抢人马节次献还，钻刀说誓，永称效顺。督抚官张佳胤等乞将原革旧赏开复，以安夷心。兵部复：如议。从之。”
- ¹⁶¹ 陈第《一斋集》(Wanli ed.)《书扎煜存》7B《答郭道见》：“去夏[1576]，炒蛮窃入乃在鸦鹊，又古北东界，所失虽少，然东牟大將軍[指戚继光]坐是削俸，协守而下论罪有差，内外缙绅士大夫、言国大计者皆洒洒然，为薊门深虑。”
- ¹⁶² 刘凤辑《刘子威杂俎》5/15A：“参将陈乾烧荒，朵颜卫酋花当子射杀之。事下兵部，王琼议声讨，遣通事往谕，必斩其子乃可赎罪。花当惧，竟斩其子以首来献。”
- ¹⁶³ 738 *zhang* of wall were built in the Gubei Kou area in 1577: “万历五年该镇册报古北口修完台墩一十六座，墙七百三十八丈。”(项笃寿《小司马草》4/61A《酌议修守机宜以裨安攘事》)
- ¹⁶⁴ Jin Hongkui, pp. 248–50.
- ¹⁶⁵ 韩霖辑《守围全书》2.1/31B, 何良焘《筑造卫城台说》；《汉语大词典》1/196.
- ¹⁶⁶ 《四镇三关志》7/252A: “至我皇上御极四年，始有拆旧墙、修新墙之议。新墙高广加于旧墙，皆以三合土筑心，表里砖包，表里垛口，纯用灰浆，足与边腹砖城比坚並久。”《戚少保年谱》11/36B also has a very similar version of this passage.
- ¹⁶⁷ Other memorials included in 《四镇三关志》 seem to be abridged versions, as evidenced by the character 略 at the end of their titles. The title of this memorial as listed in 《四镇三关志》 does not bear the character 略.
- ¹⁶⁸ 《戚少保年谱》8/16A “筑台则墙工必废，修墙则不能筑台” (1569).
- ¹⁶⁹ The core of some sections of wall in the Gubei Kou-Simatai region were built of fieldstone and *sanhetu* (Author's visit).
- ¹⁷⁰ There is, however, a short section of fieldstone and mortar wall remaining in Falcon Gap (Author's visit).
- ¹⁷¹ 陈第《一斋集·薊门军事》2/3A《古北城工述》：“江南知包砖石，而不知筑土心。江北城皆土筑，而绝无砖石。今兼而有之，且砌筑坚完，足垂久。”
- ¹⁷² 陈仁锡《陈太史无梦园初集·海集》1/61A《纪薊门险要》：“其先岁遭虏患，蹂躏无虚日。戚[继光]总理堑山湮谷、砖包边城。”
- ¹⁷³ Inscriptions in the Badaling area provide the date of the reinforcement of that wall with brick. See 程金龙《延庆的长城(续)》,《中国长城博物馆》11 (September 2003),《延庆的长城(续)》p. 42; and 华夏子《明长城考实》,北京:档案出版社(1988),p. 306. Some of the bricks at Qiangzi Ling have a date stamped on them, usually “万历十年沈阳营秋防中部造。”(Author's visit).
- ¹⁷⁴ Nan Bingwen, p. 1054.
- ¹⁷⁵ On the Korean War in the 1590s, see Mote and Twitchett, eds., *Cambridge History of China*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988) vol. 7, pp. 567–74.
- ¹⁷⁶ 李颐《李及泉先生奏议》1/10B《条陈防倭疏》：“自倭警以来，客班河间等五营留防天津，南北步骑数营调援辽左，计前后征发共二万七千有奇”；1/30B《条陈海防疏》：“应照近年防倭已行事例，无论春秋两防，以十分工程为率，量减四分，止修六分。如每砖墙一丈派军五十名，每敌楼一座派军七百名。其余次第减派，稍恤荷锸之疲，预养冲锋之锐”；杨述臣《顾襄敏公年谱》24A: “敌犯河西。时，辽左军丁精锐者尽死朝鲜；其来归者又皆疲病无马。敌数万以二千，羸弱御之，遂致失事。”(1594)；侯先春《侯少芝先生谏草》2/33B–34A《主议撤兵疏》。
- ¹⁷⁷ Based on an analysis of 39 wall building projects between 1578 and 1623 recorded on stone tablets, usually mounted on the wall. Most of these inscriptions have been transcribed in Hua Xiazi, pp. 301–06; 沈朝阳主编《秦皇岛长城》,北京:方志出版社(2002),pp. 368–83;《青龙文史资料》第四辑;穆远等《唐山境内的长城碑刻资料》87–88;《文物春秋》41 (May 1998), p. 42; Cheng Jinlong, Fang Fang, p. 26;《怀柔文物集成》. For examples of brick wall-building projects in the Chongzhen era, see 中国第一历史档案馆、辽宁省档案馆编《中国明朝档案总汇》vol. 40 item 2897《兵部为复议山西三路修边工程情形事行稿》,桂林:广西师范大学出版社,2001 (Shanxi, 1641);《明清史料》乙编, vol. 1, pp. 98A–99B《兵科抄出宣府巡抚题本》,中央研究院历史语言研究所,1972 (Xuanfu, 1633).

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